CHANGING TIRES ON THE FLY:
THE MARINES AND POSTCONFLICT STABILITY OPS

FRANK G. HOFFMAN

SEPTEMBER 2006

ABOUT FPRI

Founded in 1955, FPRI is devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests. It seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics. FPRI is a source of ideas for policymakers, a trusted resource for journalists, a center for scholars, and a prolific publisher online and in print.

FPRI conducts research on pressing issues—the war on terrorism, developments in the Middle East, relations with China, Russia, and Japan—and long-term questions such as the role of religion in international politics, or the nature of Western identity and its implications for the U.S. and the Atlantic Alliance. It publishes a quarterly journal, *Orbis*, and a series of bulletins and enotes, all of which draw on the research findings of its scholars, study groups, conferences, and seminars. And, through its Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education, it educates the public and "teaches the teachers." In this way, we serve the community and the nation, the policymakers and the educators, Wall Street and Main Street.

Foreign Policy Research Institute
1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610
Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684

For more information, contact Alan Luxenberg
at 215-732-3774, ext. 105 or
email fpri@fpri.org

www.fpri.org

CHANGING TIRES ON THE FLY:
THE MARINES AND POSTCONFLICT STABILITY OPS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introductory Note

In the wake of 9/11, President George W. Bush announced that those states that harbored or fostered terrorism would be held as accountable as the terrorists. Moving the war on terror from groups to states meant changing either governments' behavior or, failing that, the governments themselves. Military force might overthrow a regime such as the Taliban's or Saddam's, but what would be put in their place? And how could the U.S. and its allies assure the success of the new political order?

The transition between operations of war and the initial postwar phase is crucial to the success of subsequent nation-building. It demands a military force whose leaders understand the difference, whose troops are trained in that difference, and who can rely on broad-based, coordinated political and economic programs of which they are a necessary but not sufficient part. It is generally acknowledged now that U.S. and Coalition forces brought too little understanding to this enterprise, receiving in the process a rude and bloody education, one still in motion.

In 2005, FPRI commissioned a pair of studies that would analyze the lessons learned thus far from what the military calls Phase IV, or stabilization and reconstruction following the end of major conflict. American military expert Frank G. Hoffman surveyed U.S. Marine efforts in Phase IV, while Andrew Garfield led a British and American research team that interviewed British officers and officials for their perspectives on the efforts of their U.S. Coalition partner in Iraq. The Smith Richardson Foundation provided material and moral support essential to the team's success.

A coherent and integrated national level framework for stability operations and postconflict reconstruction has eluded the United States for far too long. We hope that these studies will help U.S. military and civilian planners to refine a set of best practices, including a set of principles that can become a consensus as we confront a long and difficult struggle.

Harvey Sicherman
President, FPRI

Foreword

For most of the last half of the twentieth century, the principal focus for Western military planning and readiness was the Soviet threat, but actual conflict usually took the form of proxy wars, or low-intensity conflicts. Irregular and internal conflicts were in fact the most frequent form of war over those decades. Accordingly, major powers and their military forces had to contend with both the most serious threat and the more frequent and more ambiguous mode of conflict. They did this with mixed results, especially in contingencies involving the United States. Since the dissolution of the Soviet threat in 1989, American security officials have faced a series of complex contingencies, or what the U.S. Marines often refer to as small wars.

The United States has failed to institutionally prepare itself, conceptually or structurally, to address the demands of peace support operations, stability operations, or nation-building. The U.S. military has often resisted these sorts of missions, and has been accused of resisting calls to document any clear lessons or doctrine from prior experience. This has led each succeeding generation to believe it was facing a unique problem and made necessary a slow and painful learning curve due to little institutional memory. Thus, in just about every decade of the last half of the twentieth century, the American military has learned, forgotten, and repackaged the hard-earned lessons of small wars and counterinsurgency. In a comment that is applicable to the American military as a whole, the historian Roger Spiller recently observed:

> A collective look at 'limited' military operations suggests that the US Army still has much to learn about unorthodox conflict—if only because it has forgotten so much. Notwithstanding the wide variety of intent, type, score and result in this type of operation, certain shortcomings still seem to appear with depressing regularity.[1]

The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to a larger research effort to overcome this "depressing regularity" among America's armed forces. It seeks to establish a baseline analytical survey of what occurred during the Marine portion of the initial postconflict transition period in Iraq in 2003, as well as the subsequent protracted efforts to reestablish security under the rule of law, representative government, and essential services in Iraq during 2004. It identifies the context for and assesses the performance of U.S. Marine forces in that theater. It also considers those changes made to the doctrine, structure, institutional processes, and training programs of the Marines, to better prepare future deployments in similar circumstances. The study will help identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of, the U.S.

[1] Roger Spiller, "The Small Change of Soldiering and American Military Experience," *Australian Army Journal,* Spring 2005, p. 169.

Marines and Army and the British contingents in Iraq, based on their various approaches and techniques.

F. G. Hoffman
Burke, VA

September 2006

CHANGING TIRES ON THE FLY:
THE MARINES AND POSTCONFLICT STABILITY OPS

Executive Summary

The Marines spent much of 2002 planning for what eventually came to be known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Their focus, like that of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), was on the complexities of deploying tens of thousands of Marines and their equipment to theater, and then on devising a way to rapidly pierce Iraq's military defenses. From time to time, some thought was given to the inevitable question, what happens after Baghdad is captured and the Hussein regime is dismantled? The California-based Marines of the I Marine Expeditionary Force were assigned to CENTCOM as part of the intervention. Their leaders anticipated some key challenges during this phase of the operation, which proved to be accurate. However, the conditions existing in the area of operations after OIF were not anticipated, nor was the scale of the postconflict problem. This exacerbated the obstacles brought on by the collapse of an autocratic state and a badly decomposed national infrastructure.

Nor did Marine commanders anticipate other key factors, particularly the decisions of U.S. policymakers regarding Iraq's existing institutions and military forces. These decisions also severely impacted the postconflict phase of OIF (Phase IV). So too did a lack of cultural sensitivity and basic intelligence regarding the Iraqi people. This gap was further compounded by large-scale "cordon and sweep" operations by U.S. forces that "hoovered" up large numbers of detainees, but little intelligence and even fewer insurgents. These tactics and techniques violated the basic principles of counter-insurgency and stability operations and did much to accelerate a latent but potentially lethal response to the American-led intervention.

The Marines, who found themselves unexpectedly responsible for serving as temporary governors and mayors in April 2003, were not specifically trained for these roles. However, the Marine Corps' overarching warfighting philosophy, maneuver warfare, is ideally suited for chaotic environments like those found in April 2003. With its emphasis on decentralized leadership, mission orders, and empowerment to lower leaders guided by an overarching commander's intent, this doctrine is well-suited to fluid and fast-paced environments that cannot be mastered by hierarchal bureaucracies. Likewise, the noted conception of "three-block wars"—where Marine units are conditioned to transition, literally block-to-block, between combat, constabulary, and civil affairs—was well-suited for the conditions found in Iraq. Thus, the Marines were intellectually prepared for Phase IV. Many were surprised, but most learned fast.

The combination of events the Marines faced in April 2003 is analogous to changing tires on a moving car. It's difficult if not impossible. It's equally difficult to transition from high-intensity conflict to intense civil-military operations with the same people who were antagonists in the combat phases. To shift gears from aggressive fighting to constructive relationship-building in the span of hours is near impossible.

To win over the suspect civilian population, the Marines needed to rapidly establish some sense of public order and begin repairing critical pieces of the infrastructure. They realized that they would enjoy a brief honeymoon with the Iraqis, in which order and services needed to be restored. The Marines' focus quickly shifted from the violence of combat to the reestablishment of local governance, adequate law enforcement means, and requisite public services, including power production, the distribution of potable water, sanitation, etc. The task was immense given the dilapidated nature of Iraq's infrastructure. The calamity of what was Iraq at this point in time is not fully understood by analysts reviewing the adequacy of Phase IV operations.

It would have been natural for the Marines, honed as their skills were and as oriented as they were during high-intensity combat, to continue focusing on the kinetic side of things and chase down the remnants of opposition that were visible and occasionally active. Instead, then-Major General James Mattis, the commander of Marine ground units, issued a new mission order and a new code phrase to ensure his force made the necessary shift in attitude and deportment. By issuing this order and adding the phrase "Do no harm" to the Division's rules of engagement, Mattis successfully shifted his troops from fighting *against* an enemy to fighting *for* a population. Armored vehicles and heavy weapons were shipped home, and local town council meetings and foot patrols were introduced to enhance local perceptions of self-government and security. A sense of ownership or a stake in events was introduced. A "velvet glove" approach was introduced to replace the mailed fist that had driven out Saddam.

The entire Coalition faced the challenges of establishing security and some semblance of rule of law in a society devastated by a generation of misrule, repression, and neglect. This early period involved constructive stability tasks and tense periods of patrolling to maintain order and to ensure that the former regime elements did not successfully disrupt the transition. This enemy was stunned at first, but eventually became organized and became progressively more lethal. The honeymoon passed, and the marriage produced too many irreconcilable differences.

The nature of transition operations cuts both ways. For the Marines who came to Iraq a year later, in March 2004, both fully prepared and determined to substantially redress the security and overall stability conditions in Al Anbar, the epicenter of the

Sunni-led insurgency, it was even more difficult to have to re-transition from people-centric stability operations to offensive urban combat on two days' notice in Fallujah. That operation, an overly visceral response to a provocation, had to be aborted by policymakers who failed to anticipate the political fallout of their strategic decisions.

That same force again shifted gears and returned to its previous operational areas throughout Al Anbar province determined to employ its ingrained understanding of what the Marines call Small Wars, drawn from its own *Small Wars Manual*. This 60-year old manual draws from over a century of British and U.S. military experiences, and was adapted and utilized by the Marines in light of the cultural context of Iraq's own tortured history. But the full-blown adversarial relationship that existed when the Marines returned in 2004 and took up positions in Al Anbar could not be tamed with smiles, soccer balls, or new schools.

It is pretty clear that from the moment Baghdad fell on April 9 the United States did not have the appropriate means or instruments at hand to exploit its military success. Winning the peace has proven to be much harder than winning the war. Instead of full spectrum dominance and strategic success, the desired strategic end-state in Iraq was not attained.

The principal responsibility for the enormous challenge created in Iraq is more of a failing in both strategic culture and senior policy leadership than in the military doctrines of the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. The Cold War created an extraordinary emphasis on military muscle at the expense of other instruments of national power. This has badly misshaped the total capacity of the U.S. government in other areas, producing what can be called the "one-armed Cyclops" syndrome. This caricature captures the United States' predisposition to look at problems through a single military lens and considering itself capable of responding solely with its single military arm. Its diplomatic, assistance, and informational tools are anemic by comparison. Clearly, this lack of governmental capacity has left the military holding a larger and longer role than it was designed for, or culturally disposed to execute.

Thus the U.S. military and its Coalition partners had a difficult uphill challenge. A window of opportunity was missed as the proverbial car sped by on wobbly wheels with dangerously thin tread. The military handled the initial transition period very well, and the U.S. Marines' response highlighted the mental agility of its leaders and the organizational adaptability of its expeditionary and small-wars legacy. The Marines successfully worked with local Iraqis in a predominantly Shiite area from May to October 2003. They helped establish local security and governance, and only suffered a single casualty in five months. But this experience also revealed shortcomings in specific capabilities or organizational capacities uniquely relevant to protracted

complex counterinsurgencies. Shortfalls were found in cultural intelligence, language capacity, and human intelligence. New planning skills for meshing non-kinetic tools, civil affairs, and information operations into more traditional security operations were needed. The depth or capacity of civil affairs units and staff expertise in key areas were found wanting and rectified. An institutional need for formal training and preparation of units to train and advise foreign military forces was eventually "relearned." In 2004, not all of these shortfalls were yet completely recognized or rectified.

These shortfalls have been identified and are being resolved with appropriate doctrinal, organizational, educational, and materiel changes. The Marines created more robust or more refined units and organizations to ensure that future generations can adapt even faster to the unique demands of postconflict situations and complex contingencies in which military forces must integrate seamlessly with other partners including non-military agencies from the U.S. and international community. Without flogging my metaphor too much, the next generation of Marines will quickly change the tire before the car gains momentum.

Key Insights

Several key insights and perspectives have been derived from the investigation of U.S. Marine efforts before, during, and after OIF.

Plan with the End in Mind. Campaigns should not merely focus on the military aspects, but need to include and be shaped by the end-state defined by political and strategic guidance. Clearly, this did not occur for OIF at the strategic and policy level. Inherent to ongoing efforts within the U.S. military to explore alternative campaign-planning constructs and to establish stability operations as the equivalent of warfighting capabilities in its importance to U.S. interests is the acknowledgment that U.S. planning efforts were incomplete at best.

Comprehensive and integrated approach. The need to employ all tools in the national tool chest, not just the military, is a recurring insight, another lesson relearned at great expense. In particular, the gaps in governance, power, and services during the golden hour materially contributed to the underlying support for the insurgency. The inability of the ad hoc Coalition Provisional Authority to get its arms around the most immediate problems and to integrate the significant American and international resources available is remarkable given the importance of the assignment to U.S. foreign policy.

Nuance counts, heavy-handed approaches should be avoided. Heavy units are wrong for stability operations, as confined troops are focused more on the needs of the vehicle than on those of the community and the external operational situation. Even when dismounted, they still tend to think like tankers as opposed to infantry. But a "patrolling" operational culture is essential to successful security and peacekeeping operations. Battalion-sized operations tend not to produce significant results. The enemy simply goes to ground in their houses. Patience, persistence, and restraint must be coupled with resolve to effectively counter an insurgency, always remembering that it's the people and their support that are ultimately critical to success.

Culture matters; in fact, it is crucial. All interviews emphasized the absolutely essential need for accurate and relevant cultural intelligence when operating in urban environments with direct and recurring contact with the local population. Marine intelligence experts realize that what they call "cultural terrain" can be difficult to navigate. From planning to interfacing with key leaders at the village and town level, some appreciation of the nature of the culture and its implications is simply indispensable.

Create Gaps, Avoid Surfaces. The American default position was to attack the insurgents head on, essentially an "anti-insurgency" campaign vice a classical counterinsurgency model. The Corps' maneuver warfare philosophy teaches Marines to avoid strong points, what are called surfaces, and to seek gaps to exploit the enemy's rear or disrupt his overall system. This has equal application against insurgencies if one understands that the insurgents are a surface, and that the gap that is to be exploited and widened is the gap between the insurgent cadre and the general population. The goal is to widen this gap to the greatest degree possible and avoid more destructive anti-insurgency operations.

Communicate, communicate, communicate. The Marines stressed the importance of every Marine as an intelligence collector, but they also believed that a commander's themes need to be pushed down to every man in their area as well—in a sense, every Marine a Rifleman, an intelligence collector, *and* an information operations (IO) disseminator. In this sense, the Marines understood that actions would speak louder and with more credibility than leaflets, broadcasts, and posters. Thus, every patrol and every council meeting was an opportunity to influence the population and ensure that the key themes of the American support to Iraq were consistently and frequently communicated. IO was not considered the domain of IO specialists, but a supporting arm with all Marines participating. Such tactical fusion, however, will not resolve the larger problem of connecting the strategy to strategic IO themes and supporting operational and tactical actions. Regrettably, the processes that the U.S. government put into effect to manage the strategic end of the informational component of the

counterinsurgency never seemed to click. Universally, operational commanders could not identify key strategic themes from Washington or gain any additional support for operational/tactical information activities. Equally frustrating were the long production and product-approval cycles for IO products that were completely out of sync with the rapid nature of information processing in modern societies and the need to rapidly counter gossip, misinformation, and outright distortions coming from the insurgents.

Policing over warfighting. Many Marines emphasized the value of persistent patrolling. The Marines, the 101st, and the UK conducted extensive foot patrolling throughout the urban centers, while other units tended to operate mobile patrols that limited their penetration into side streets and neighborhoods. The two approaches were compared to the cop on the beat as opposed to police patrolling in squad cars. Although the dismounted approach is in theory more dangerous, the constant interaction between the forces and the locals produced intelligence and foster a relationship that many believed contributed to a relatively lower incidence of violence. This is just one of many paradoxes and counterintuitive aspects of preventing or responding to counterinsurgency.

Conclusion

It might be true that the Marines did not have a formal doctrine for what was to follow their impressive drive towards Baghdad. But as General Mattis has remarked, "doctrine is the last refuge of the unimaginative." More than formal doctrine, military leaders need to be broadly educated and prepared to adapt their operational modes, planning processes and even their organizations on the fly to meet the unique circumstances they find on the ground. Each contingency must be evaluated on its own cultural context, informed by history and political guidance.

Hopefully, history will be exploited in the current case and the proper lessons drawn. The price of rapid and sudden military success need not always rely upon completely *ad hoc* solutions with tools ill-suited for the purpose. Nor should operations be conducted in such a way that they engender or actively motivate a resistance to our own policy aims. The U.S. military should consult with its allies and study its own history to better prepare for transition operations using predominantly military forces.

Changing flat tires is a messy necessity of modern life, but it doesn't have to be done on a moving car—*while being shot at*. Nor does it have to be done with one arm (or agency). This will require additional educational, doctrinal, and some force structure changes within the American national security community. Just as important, it will

require additional investment in non-military tools to ensure that tomorrow's Cyclops has a holistic "lens" and is fully armed with all elements of national power.

* * *

CHANGING TIRES ON THE FLY:
THE MARINES AND POSTCONFLICT STABILITY OPS

Introduction

> *All the sudden I was the mayor of 8 cities… I had no idea I would be responsible for getting the water running, turning on the electricity, and running an economy.*[2]

What almost all American civilian leaders and many military planners thought was the decisive phase of OIF ended April 10, 2003. Marine and Coalition forces transitioned at this time from major combat operations to Phase IV stability operations, relying upon their organic capabilities and mental agility with varying degrees of success. The scope of this phase was not anticipated, but the key parameters and requirements, as well as the necessity for a successful transition phase, were well recognized by Marines before they embarked for the Middle East. The planners of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the leadership of the 1st Marine Division had anticipated some key challenges during this phase of the operation, which proved to be accurate.[3] However, they did not anticipate either the conditions existing in the area of operations (AO) after OIF or the temporal scale of the problem. This exacerbated the unique obstacles faced by any power in the face of the collapse of an autocratic state and the corresponding need to provide security, order, and public services.

Nor did Marine commanders anticipate other factors, particularly the decisions of U.S. policymakers regarding Iraq's military and police forces. These decisions also severely affected the postconflict phase of OIF. However, the Marine Corps' overarching warfighting philosophy, maneuver warfare, is ideally suited to chaotic environments like those in which they found themselves in April 2003.[4] With its emphasis on decentralized leadership, mission orders, and empowerment to lower leaders guided by an overarching commander's intent, this doctrine is a good fit for dynamic environments which cannot be understood much less controlled by dense hierarchal bureaucracies. Equally useful for the conditions found in Iraq was the noted conception of "three-block wars," where Marine units are conditioned to

---

[2] Marine colonel interviewed by Dr. Janine Davidson following major combat operations in Iraq, cited in her presentation, "Learning to Win the Four-Block War," PowerPoint presentation, Jan. 23, 2006.

[3] Interview with Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC Aug. 1, 2004 at Camp Fallujah, and interviews with Lt. Gen. Mattis and Col. John Toolan, USMC on Mar. 11, 2006, Quantico, Va.

[4] U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting*, Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, June 20, 1997.

sequentially transition, literally block to block, between combat, constabulary, and civil affairs.[5]

The combination of events that produced the conditions that obtained for the period of study, April 2003 to late 2004**,** is analogous to changing tires on a car on the fly. It's extremely challenging to change tires on a moving automobile, and it's equally difficult to transition from high-intensity conflict to intense civil-military operations with the same people who may have been contesting the combat phases. For the Marines who came to Iraq a year later in March 2004 determined to substantially redress the security and overall stability conditions in Al Anbar, it was even more difficult to have to retransition from a stability operation to offensive operations on two days' notice in Fallujah, a mission they bitterly protested against.[6] That same force again shifted gears and returned to its previous AO determined to employ its ingrained understanding of what the Marines call small wars, drawn from its historically grounded *Small Wars Manual* (1940).[7] This manual draws from over a century of British and U.S. military experiences, and was adapted and utilized by the Marines in light of the cultural context of Iraq's own tortured history.

OIF I Operational Summary

Phase IV evolved for the Marines of I MEF from April 10–20 as the force was repositioned to a sector in the south of Iraq. Here the Marines formally transitioned from conventional military operations to what the U.S. Army termed "security and stabilization operations" (SASO). SASO began almost immediately as the Marines stopped fighting in Baghdad. Each regiment of the 1st Marine Division, led by then-Major General James N. Mattis, established local security sectors and patrols to ensure public security and safety in their assigned areas.[8]

They also established what the Marines call civil-military operations centers (CMOC), which are the doctrinal command and control arrangement for interacting with international aid organizations and nongovernmental aid entities during any

[5] Charles C. Krulak, "The Three-Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, New York: Dec. 15, 1997, pp. 139-42.

[6] Interviews with Lt. Gen. Conway and then-Maj. Gen. Mattis in Iraq, August 2004. See also Bing West, *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah*, New York: Bantam Books, 2005.

[7] U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, Government Printing Office, 1940. For an interesting history on the development of this manual see Keith Bickel, *Mars Learning,: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001.

[8] This section is founded on the three part series on the 1st Marine Division's SASO efforts by the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General John F. Kelly, "From Tikrit to Babylon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb.-April, 2004.

humanitarian disaster. The Marines first instituted and then formalized this process during their experiences in Somalia in the early 1990s. The 1st Marine Division also organized a division-level CMOC, set up by the 11th Marine Regiment. The artillery force was not as expended as the infantry units during the drive to Baghdad, and their communications and transportation assets made them ideal for postconflict operations or humanitarian crises.[9] The 1st Marine Division CMOC was up and running even before hostilities ended. It was quite evident that the absence of civil society and order was creating chaos in the form of looting, crime, and communal retribution.

Thus, the Marines' focus of effort had to quickly shift from the violence of combat to the reestablishment of local governance, adequate law enforcement means, and requisite public services including power production, the distribution of potable water, sanitation, etc. The calamity of what was Iraq at this point in time is often poorly understood by analysts reviewing the adequacy of Phase IV operations. First, the environmental conditions were difficult for all U.S. forces. Having just completed several months of preparation and a brief few weeks of rapid maneuver warfare, many Marines might reasonably have expected to fall back along their lines of communication and reembark on their amphibious shipping for a calm trip home. Some of their leaders expected this, and it infected the thinking of the MEF—for about a day, until new instructions were passed. The Marines mentally regrouped and then quickly charged into their new mission. They did so in a very hot and humid climate, with temperatures in August peaking at more than 130 degrees Fahrenheit. They also did so in the complete absence of any local structures with which to work. The usual occupation force expects some level of national, provincial, or even municipal government to work with.

All the Marines found was elation at Saddam's demise and pent-up demands for almost every form of social service and humanitarian need. To win over the suspicious civilian population, the Marines needed to rapidly establish some sense of public order and begin repairing critical pieces of the infrastructure. They realized that they would enjoy a brief honeymoon with the Iraqis, in which order and services needed to be restored.[10] The Iraqi infrastructure suffered from three ongoing catastrophes, including a) Saddam's negligence over several decades in providing adequate energy and public sanitation, b) ongoing looting of a massive scale that attacked visible signs of Saddam's Baathist rule, and c) damage caused by truculent sympathizers and former regime officials, who hoped to discredit the Coalition's effort. The impact of these conditions must be taken into account in any assessment

[9] Bing West and Raymond Smith, *The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division*, New York: Bantam Books, 2003.

[10] Mattis interview, Mar. 11, 2006.

of the complexity of the SASO mission. The entire Coalition faced the challenges of establishing security and some semblance of rule of law in a society devastated by a generation of misrule, repression, and neglect. This early period involved SASO in the day and tense periods of patrolling in the night to maintain order and to ensure that the former regime elements did not successfully disrupt the transition. This enemy was stunned at first, but eventually organized and became progressively more lethal.

Because of the psychological state of the populace and the physical state of the country's infrastructure, this SASO mission proved to be enormously challenging. To external reviewers, this may come across as an excuse for ad hoc or even reluctant participation in the Phase IV mission. Ideally, the Coalition would have liked to have a much more functional society with an array of intact and functioning governmental and service sectors. These were not the conditions on the ground, nor were all these considerations known to Marine planners prior to the intervention. But it was not a pick-up game, nor were the Marines rank amateurs when it comes to SASO, disaster relief, or small wars. The MEF staff, under the command of Lt. Gen. James Conway, initiated a number of staff projects and planning based on worst-case scenarios. General Mattis himself had generated plans for SASO requirements that went well beyond anything the American government or its policymakers and military planners were preparing for Iraq once Saddam's regime was toppled. He realized that there were "no saints" among the former regime elements but felt that they were convertible with the proper approach.[11]

SASO in Baghdad

The Division's preparations and its enormous reservoir of creativity and agility were amply evident in the middle of April, while the Division still occupied Saddam's capital. Once the regime had been toppled (or more accurately fled with its pockets filled), an enormous power vacuum existed. With stubborn resistance elements still moving about and ambushes and murders a nightly occurrence, security remained a challenge, and the U.S. government's mechanism for postconflict management, the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activity (OHRA), was not prepared to shoulder any major responsibilities. Its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was still being birthed and could not fill the vacuum. A number of factions based on religious, tribal, and sectarian fissures began to move into the vacuum for personal or factional advantage. Ever mindful of its commander's intent, expressed with the powerfully simple motto, "No better friend, no worse enemy," the Marines of 1st Marine Division began to work on restoring a sense of normalcy to the lives of average Iraqi citizens even in the absence of any functioning public bureaucracy and

[11] "Eminently convertible" was General Mattis's take. Ibid.

in the presence of a nascent but palpable enemy.[12] Too many disgruntled regime loyalists, foreign jihadists, and self-employed spoilers were active to ignore. Yet, the vast majority of the population enjoyed the assistance and the protection afforded by the U.S. Marines, even if they were suspicious of American intentions and uncertain what their personal or national future offered.

The most immediate challenge to the Marines in Baghdad was the sheer impossibility of even trying to both secure and service their sector of Baghdad, with its some 5 to 6 million citizens. The Marines, working out of their CMOC, began the process of asking key leaders to come forward and identify their most crucial requirements. The resumption of critical services, especially power and fuel distribution, were high on the list, as were medical services and operating hospitals. The Marines recognized the importance of working and being seen as working with the city's secular and religious leaders, and arranged their meetings with press attendance as a form of IO, to highlight the inclusion of Iraqi participation as full partners in the effort to repair and rebuild their city. A flurry of leaflets and broadcasts were issued to report on American efforts and the concrete progress made to restore order. Radio broadcasts, in particular, assisted local leaders and security forces by appealing to the citizens of Baghdad to observe a self-imposed curfew between the calls to evening and morning prayers. The Marine CMOC's activities accelerated. With the combined efforts of the Marine CMOC, the numerous nongovernmental organizations, and courageous Iraqi citizens, the restoration of the capital's essential services started.

Thanks to this partnership, a degree of comity was achieved and a secure environment established. Reestablishing some local government and the civil sectors of the government's vast bureaucracy were next. Achieving a secure environment and establishing local leadership was needed to create the conditions for the safe introduction of international relief and aid organizations into the city. This was recognized as the level of stability that the military could achieve as a steppingstone to a better Iraq and a broader international base for reconstruction and aid.

While the Division was implementing its main effort with the CMOC in early April, the Division was ordered to reallocate its maneuver units to new positions. The Division prepared to turn over its AO to the U.S. Army. A coordinated and detailed relief in place commenced on April 18. The 1st Marines went to Al Iskandariyah. Elements of the Fighting Fifth Marines shifted from the vicinity of Samarra. Task Force Tripoli came out last from Tikrit-Bayji, another 100 miles north of Samarra, and moved

[12] This simple maxim, the commander's intent, was clearly understood throughout the Marine element, down to the lowliest private, and captured the crucial need for deliberate use of firepower and discrimination in all endeavors.

south. One battalion of its assets was ordered to the border to contain the influx of fighters, smugglers and contraband crossing in from Iran. By April 21 the Marines completed the shift, and the Division set up shop near Ad Diwaniyah in an abandoned tank repair facility.[13]

Source: CIA World Factbook

Throughout this period, all units received tips and local intelligence on members of the former regime. Most of this intelligence came freely from that vast majority of Iraqis who welcomed their liberators and desired a better future for themselves and their country. In the absence of any functional Coalition mechanisms to provide advice, assistance, or policy, the Marines turned to their own wits and the direction of the MEF and Division staffs. The CMOC established basic functional areas for law enforcement, electricity and power, water, and medical services. Without any guidance, it appeared that local security would have to be reestablished and professionalized. So the Marines appointed an interim police chief and created a police academy to train volunteers and applicants in basic community policing techniques. Power production was a huge challenge. The Marines had to coax electrical engineers and former power generator workmen to come back to work. Getting the various components of the power grid back on line was seen as essential to the restoration of normalcy. Without power, the most basic of human services were

[13] For an official history of the Marines in Iraq, see Nicholas E. Reynolds, *Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War*, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

out of reach, as was getting the local economy running. The international aid community arrived by this time and pitched in, and the Marines were glad for their expertise and effort.

It would have been very natural for the Marines, as oriented as they were during Phase III to high-intensity combat, to continue focusing on the kinetic side of things and chase down the remnants of opposition that were visible and occasionally active. Instead, General Mattis issued a new mission order and a new code phrase to ensure his force made the necessary shift in attitude and deportment. By issuing this order and the additive "Do no harm" phrase to the division's rules of engagement, Mattis successfully shifted his troops from fighting an enemy to one that was fighting for a population. The logic was deductive, assuming that the population would eventually provide the necessary actionable intelligence to find any remaining Baathists or criminal elements; Mattis reoriented his entire command into isolating the enemy by securing the local populations in each town his command would occupy.[14]

As part of this mental shift, Mattis ordered his forces out of their heavy vehicles to conduct dismounted patrols. Body armor was reduced, commensurate with the tactical situations. Marines were ordered to remove their helmets and sunglasses. "Wave tactics" were underscored as Marines tried to interact with the local population. Tanks and heavy weapons were shipped back south to Kuwait to begin their redeployment to America; they were anathema to the Division's concept of operations in postconflict scenarios.

Phase IV SASO

The Marine's new AO amounted to close to the southern half of Iraq (excluding 1st UK Division's zone around Basra), with nearly 40 percent of the Iraqi population. The ground units postponed an aggressive entry into their new areas because of the unexpected movement of a vast throng of Shias in the Arbaeen pilgrimage. Because of a desire not to interfere with the movement of so many Iraqis and visitors, some Phase IV positions were not occupied for a week or more until the pilgrimage was completed. Here the Marines thought that doing nothing was exactly the right thing to do, and further, they exploited it by providing fresh water to the moving mass of worshipers. It was hoped that this opening might set the tone for positive relations with an admittedly cautious and even hostile population. By April 24, 2003 the Marines were deployed in their Phase IV zones as follows: Al Muthanna (2d Battalion,

[14] Carl E. Mundy III, "Spare the Rod, Save the Nation," *New York Times*, Dec. 30, 2003.

5th Marines (2/5)), Karbala (3/7), Babil (1/4), Al Qadisiyah (3/5), and An Najaf (1/7).[15]

The Division's new "battlespace" was the overwhelmingly Shia-populated area of southern Iraq, contiguous to the Iranian border and exclusive of the Basra area which went to the British. Here, the Marines were even challenged more than the dense sector of eastern Baghdad The purposeful neglect of this area as part of Hussein's strategy to retain Sunni control of the Shia majority in the south had all but collapsed the public infrastructure and economic system. This created a major series of challenges for the newly designated military governors-read battalion commanders-in control of the seven provinces. Generally speaking, there was no reliable water purification system, no intact power grid, and not even basic sanitation, sewage treatment, or trash collection. The region was filthy and malaria-ridden, and threatened by disease thanks to piles of human waste dumped along the road. It was a public health disaster for both the inhabitants and the Coalition's forces. The Baath party and the police, a force whose sole competence was repression and corruption, had melted away.

The Division recognized that its grasp of the situation required a more detailed assessment of each province and city. An integrated strategy that tailored its approach and reallocated finite resources to the specific needs of each area was badly needed. This assessment had to include key leaders of each locality and their affiliation, the status of critical infrastructure, any existing threats that might worsen the situation.

Thrown into this dangerous and chaotic environment, the Marines responded with the ability to improvise that is the bedrock of expeditionary maneuver warfare. Trained to work off of the minimal amount of policy guidance and a visualization of what their commander was trying to achieve, the Marines didn't wait for detailed guidance or expect a lot of help from the CPA as it struggled to get its arms around the major political problems in Baghdad proper. Marines are trained to expect ambiguity in small wars and educate their officers to exploit every opportunity. These commanders recognized from their education and *Small Wars* manual that waiting for external assistance or more prescriptive instructions was a forlorn hope. They also recognized that leadership would have to be even further decentralized from battalion commander to company commanders and even down to the squad leaders on patrol who would provide the vast majority of the multitude of day-to-day contacts between the liberating force, and the indigenous population. They became, in essence "benevolent dictators" charged with using their own judgment to slice through the

[15] See the series by General Kelly and Reynolds, *Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond*, p. 149.

myriad competing factional and political agendas and fury of emotions that dominated postwar Iraq.[16]

Armed with the clear intent of their commander and the common-sense, documented wisdom of their predecessors, they set to work. Basic services and a veneer of security were quickly set in each city and town as the Marines entered and took over. These efforts were hamstrung by the inadequate and looted infrastructure and absent technicians to operate and maintain it. The starting conditions were not ameliorated by the CPA's distance and apparent lack of interest in areas outside of its base in the Green Zone, which was described as "episodic interest."[17] Nor were they lubricated by resources for recovery. Each commander nonetheless took charge of his adopted city, and unshackled it from its past while trying to put it on a clear path for a sustainable recovery and a better peace.

Given the enormous challenge of initially trying to gain access and maintain a modicum of control over this diverse and complicated area, the Marine leadership decided to decentralize responsibility for each local area to the designated military battalion commanders assigned to each town. They each became the military governor of their respective area, although they were not to act as such. The Marine approach was to quickly bring the maximum benefit to the greatest number of people possible, trying to build momentum and support. This is an "inside-out" strategy. By starting in the major population centers and working outward to the outlying countryside, the strategy sought to generate success in the short term that would sow the seeds for the more substantive reconstruction and political reform the Marines expected to be coming. The Marines discovered that there were so many different factions, leaders, and claimants for assistance that no decision could be made that did not generate a response from one party or group or another. This required each leader to gauge the power structure until they knew the lay of the land and could understand how their efforts were perceived and how they could be linked to maximize their acceptance and effect. For both sides this early transition period was a learning curve of mutual discovery. As each commander gained more understanding of Iraqi local politics and the specific area he controlled, they also learned how to wield their authority with diplomacy to produce mutually acceptable compromises that maximized the benefits for the entire population.

Each province, city, and even village had its own unique personality, or what some call "micro-climates," but two cities—Karbala and Najaf—were expected to be

[16] This is General Kelly's phrase.
[17] Mattis interview, Mar. 11, 2006.

especially complicated.[18] These were the two holiest cities in the Shia faith. The sensitivities of the religious community based in these holy cities were deeply set. Karbala, with a population of over half a million, was host to the shrine of a martyred grandson of Mohammed himself, the Imam Abi Abdillah Al Husain. The shrine to this founder of the Shia sect of Islam has huge significance to its adherents. Only slightly bigger than Karbala, Najaf is home to tomb of Hussein, son-in-law of the prophet Mohammed. Both cities contain numerous religious sites, relics, mosques, and burial sites. Furthermore, as the spiritual epicenters of this component of Islam, these two cities are also the base of operation for most of the sect's most influential spiritual leaders, the ayatollahs and other imams.

Blue Diamond, the Division's call sign, was also introduced to a new watchword—"do no harm"—and instructed to add this to their philosophy of dealing with the Iraqi population, the overwhelming majority of who were simply trying to survive.[19] Priority of work was established under the mantra of Police, Power, and Popular Government. These priorities were established to implement and satisfy a sort of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Once local security was satisfied, the Marines would turn to power (essentially electric and fuel oil). This power was required to restore a suite of essential services. Without energy distribution, maintaining order would be unfathomable. Finally, the Marines would seek to generate popular governance, and introduce the Iraqi population to the wonders of democracy—subject to their own vision and needs not necessarily a microcosm of mainstream America.

Transition Strategy: Police, Power, and People

Assessments in every province identified that the three most pressing needs were for police, power (electric power and fuel deliveries), and local governmental structures.

Police. The restoration of police services was a challenge made more difficult by the suspicion with which the population held every member of each department in the country. Winning the public's trust and confidence here would be a daunting task. The police expected little respect, and the people were inured to these officers' making up for their low salaries with bribes and payoffs. In spite of the visibly urgent need to get police out on the streets immediately, it was also necessary to send a signal to the officers and to their civilian populations that their standards and missions had

[18] The term micro-climate comes from a retired American intelligence analyst, Jeffrey White, "Thoughts on Irregular Warfare," Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996, p. 58, at www.cia.gov.

[19] The Hippocratic aspect of this additional Rule of Engagement was deliberate; a reflection of the professional requirement to carefully examine a patient and ensure no additional harm could come to the "patient," which was the Iraqi people.

been changed. Improper conduct by police officers would not be tolerated in the new force. The battalion commanders fired the entire force in most towns and only rehired those that were vetted as reliable. Some commanders even had local officials and private citizens participate in the vetting process to get their insights and reinforce the community service–based approach. In the absence of external assistance, a few Marine commanders set up police academies with instruction in basic police techniques, weapons use, and ethics. As soon as some acceptable officers were produced, the commanders began conducting joint Marine/Iraqi Police patrols.

After initial training programs came longer-term initiatives, including expanded training opportunities, internal affairs functions, management, expanded ethics sessions, and instruction in the law. In As Samawah, for instance, a ten-day course was established by 2/5 that graduated over 700 officers. In many of the provinces, commanders requested and received the services of Reserve Marines who were police officers in their civilian lives. Marine and Army military policemen were instrumental throughout, adding their talents and expertise to the daily functioning of the departments. By July 2003 these initiatives had matured to the point that joint patrols were all but eliminated. The streets were placed almost entirely into the hands of Iraqi policemen.

Power/Energy. A sufficient and reliable supply of electrical power and fuel was the critical shortfall during the entire security and stabilization operations period. This was a major issue and the test of the Marines' effectiveness, as all sources of energy, including diesel, benzene (gas), and propane, were essential. Each component of the power distribution network was burdened with corruption, inefficiency, and shortages. The infrastructure was decrepit, with little maintenance having been conducted since the 1991 Gulf War. Marine commanders/governors assaulted all three problems at once, seeking out engineers and workers afraid to come to work and ensuring their protection. Until the pipelines were repaired and protected, precious fuel had to be trucked long distances from the refineries around Basra. This was rather impractical, since the power generation facilities required more than 100,000 gallons of fuel daily and there were several plants in each area to supply.

The answer was security, but it was impossible to patrol many thousands of miles of pipeline and power systems. Over-the-road movement was also unreliable, as convoys were subject to frequent hijackings. There was no single answer to the problem. In Najaf 1/7 organized Task Force Rio to provide security to the lines within its zone. Another solution was to involve the I Marine Expeditionary Force's aviation element ,with all pilots directed to fly the lines and report on suspicious activity.

Local Government. The difficulty of running half a country can be summed up by a lack of a dependable public service bureaucracy. With over 10 million inhabitants and all of the associated functions of providing utilities, schools, sanitation, medical care, and nutrition, this level of organization was critical—and nonexistent. Recovery would not be as easy as simply rehiring the Iraqis who had previously held these posts. The regime's method for civil service had been irrationally centralized and notoriously ineffective. Loyalty to the party was, of course, infinitely more important than competence, as this was a key component in how the regime penetrated to the lowest level of Iraqi life, entered the home, and exercised control. The system was almost entirely corrupt and nepotistic in the worst way, without concern or interest in the well-being of constituents. Town councils or city managers had no concept of how to do anything that required a decision, habituated as they were to executing commands from Baghdad. The absence of the regime's corrupt henchmen, however, left the now vetted local leadership without even basic instructions.

The responses were the same throughout the Marines' AO. Commanders at all levels met with local government officials, technocrats, and sheikhs, and vetted them in terms of how connected to the former regime they may have been. Pledges of commitment to granting political power to the people in a newly organized civil structure came quickly. In Al Hillah, for example, 1/4 Marines held initial meetings and convinced officials and government workers to create a city council to provide a check and balance on the new government's actions. Meetings were also held with religious and tribal leaders to identify independent delegates for the council.

Similarly in Karbala, the city council, led by a serving official, was engaged by representatives of 3/7 to start the process of restoring city services and critical infrastructure. Trouble developed, however, when hundreds of citizens demonstrated over the retention of the incumbent, a man they accused as a high-ranking and corrupt Baath Party goon thug. The commander met with the demonstrators and reached a solution. In mid-May, elections for a new interim city council were held, with all positions temporary and performance-based until the establishment of a more permanent structure once the CPA decided on future political structures. The end result was, for the first time in any Iraqi's memory, a council with real leadership ability and the interests of the community at heart.

In As Samawah, the capital of Al Muthanna, 2/5 Marines look advantage of a unique set of circumstances that made the environment more conducive to honest government. Under the firm direction of the commander, the city's government made a miraculous turnaround. With the effort led by the battalion's legal officer, the first structure rebuilt was the local criminal and civil court system. The effort gained credibility by partnership with the twelve most prominent tribal leaders. In May the

new judiciary was stood up and four honest and popularly screened judges sworn in. City payroll procedures were next with checks and balances in place to minimize extortion, corruption, and skimming by senior officials. The city council, once a tool of the regime, was elected. A more legitimate, responsive, and representative council went to work for the first time in anyone's memory. As a check to the power of the sheikhs, a wide range of professionals were added, as well as nine political and religious parties.

Another Case Study: Al Najaf

On April 24, 2003, 1/7 conducted a relief in place with the 101st Airborne Division in Najaf. Najaf was the revered location where the Shiite 13th imam, Ali, was martyred. It is home to the Grand Mosque of Ali, built in his name. As a result, Najaf had become the seat of Iraq's most respected Shiite clerics, including Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and the central seat of Shia religious teaching and education. The battalion's arrival was ironically synchronized with the ongoing pilgrimage or *hajj* by thousands of Shiite faithful. This pilgrimage was a major tradition for the Shia that had been prohibited by Saddam. Now the pilgrims were returning with enthusiasm, reflecting the benefits of the American intervention. But the Marines found the roads leading to Najaf choked, and rather than interfere, the Marine columns stepped aside and cheered them on. The battalion had an opportunity to assist pilgrims with water and some medical assistance which won some points with city elders and clerics.

Upon arriving in the city, 1/7 Marines, under the command of Lt. Col. Christopher Conlin, moved into the firm bases previously occupied by elements of the 101st Airborne. Per their instructions, they shipped out their armored vehicles, particularly the cumbersome Assault Amphibious Vehicle Company. The unit began adopting the less threatening, more approachable "velvet glove" that General Mattis set the tone for. As Conlin put it, "We were there to work with the city to provide stability and security, not to intimidate or destroy it."[20]

As the Marines moved into Najaf, they had to conduct an assessment of that city's situation. The commander divided the city into sectors and assigned companies to establish firm bases and begin extensive saturation patrols. Quick reaction forces were set up in case any elements were threatened. The commanding officer found that the city did not face a violent degree of insurgent activity or coercion from Baathist elements, but it did suffer from a large degree of general lawlessness.

[20] Christopher Conlin, "What Do You Do for an Encore?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sept. 2004, p. 76.

Conlin fully recognized that the government structure had been toppled, which presented a vacuum. He realized that societies tend to spontaneously rebuild themselves using alternative or other existing power structures, perhaps, tribal, or criminal, or religious, whichever was strong enough to take control. He was immediately besieged by requests for decisions, resources, and security forces. Every where he turned, someone wanted to see him or wanted the Marines to immediately restore or establish new services. Conlin's personal journal captures a series of questions he asked himself the first few days, "Who is government? What is government? Where is government?" He found the answer was looking at him in the mirror. Like his fellow commanders, he found the infrastructure to be hopelessly dilapidated.

> Every facet of this modern city was hard down, and no one knew where the magic 'big red switch' was to turn it back on. Instead, it appeared that it was all fatally interlinked like a circle of dominoes. Each critical service was dependent on another couple to get back on line, and none could be easily kick started. From time to time we ran into individuals who claimed to have the answers, but the sad truth was that the utilities infrastructure had been in a death spiral before we came and gave its last gasp as we arrived.[21]

Najaf already had a mayor appointed by coalition forces. The city's role as a religious center was recognized early, and its importance to plans for Iraq's reconstruction were clear. Because of the influence of key religious figures over the Shia majority, the son of a martyred Shia cleric was appointed to head the city. Regrettably, he was killed his first day in the city. In his stead, the Central Intelligence Agency recommended a resistance leader named Abdul Munim, a retired Colonel in the Republican Guard. A disabled veteran of the Iran-Iraq conflict, Munim had run the Najaf resistance group just as American forces approached the city. He was a long standing resident, with a distinct constituency and amount of popular support including that of numerous local Sheiks. But his appointment by the Coalition was the antithesis of what the city wanted/needed and skewed U.S. credibility very early on. But then when Conlin attempted to rectify the situation and displace the incumbent by a city election, the CPA rushed to cancel it at the last minute because it did not trust an untested electoral process to produce a desirable candidate.

Conlin's battalion was also in transition. Conlin took little time in adapting his organization as well as his mode of operations. His first step was to reframe how his staff was structured in order to reflect a changing mission. Since his traditional staff was based on operations no longer required, operations on large targets with extensive fire support assets, he no longer needed a robust fire support control staff as he did

[21] Ibid, p. 75.

during the drive to Baghdad. This freed up a talented team for new duties as a civil-military operations center. The Battalion Air Officer became the head of this CMOC with his team of forward air controllers/forward observers and their communicators as his staff. Instead of processing messages and requests for fires to destroy things, the fire support staff turned into city managers processing requests for assistance, repair or construction or going out as contact teams to problem areas to devise solutions. This allowed the Battalion's small civil affairs teams to focus their efforts on the most critical issues without becoming tied down in routine logistics matters the CMOC could deal with.

Conlin also retasked and reoriented his intelligence team. Now that the enemy consisted of elusive but cunning and lethal former regime members and Baath diehards, he did not see the need for the same process and procedures. The Battalion's units were doing very well tracking the recalcitrant or troublemakers using the locals and Human Exploitation Teams (HETs) on-site to turn small bits of information into actionable intelligence. But the need to assess the city's population needs, its political nature and organizations, and the mosaic of affiliations and tribes was simply daunting. He formed a joint intelligence center that combined the talents of the PsyOps detachment, civil affairs team, and HETs into an analytical entity that could make sense of the reams of raw data flowing in for patterns and trend analysis. This refined intelligence became "the lifeblood for our operations."[22]

That battalion created hunter-killer teams on the fly, sending our very talented HETs, psychological operations (PsyOps), and civil affairs group (CAG) teams down to the platoon level in some cases to rapidly turn around actionable intelligence from one target to the next. The need for effective and timely information operations was a key component of Conlin's mission. He let his small PsyOps team operate in general support, led by this overall guidance and the intent of General Mattis. The Information Operations team sponsored some locally produced television info-mercials, and orchestrated an effective media campaign with both American and Arab networks (Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya). They developed products usually well outside their cumbersome product approval chain, and also supported the Commander's information program with media support that consistently outcycled the competition. Everything they accomplished was pushing the limits of formal doctrine, and required additional production assets such as high-speed printers and civilian television/radio transmitters.

He also reorganized the basic combat formations of the reinforced battalion to better support the new mission. Each rifle company was assigned a zone to provide security

[22] Ibid, p. 76.

and "govern" like a borough. Each company created "firm bases" to use as a bed down site. The firm bases allowed commanders to run continuous operations in their zones to provide persistent presence and a sense of commitment. The preferred tactic was foot-mobile patrolling called "saturation patrolling."[23] These foot-mobile patrols were very approachable by the locals, a tactic facilitated by pushing interpreters down to the platoon level. This allowed units to build rapport with local officials, formally demonstrate the U.S. commitment to their security, resulting in many tips from the locals on the location of specific threats. These patrols also were useful in getting a real feel for the street rhythm of each locale and gave each unit commander the ability to improve his situational awareness. When units picked up something credible on a threat, the unit would often simply handle it itself resulting in an extremely high tempo of operations. Due to manpower shortages, the weapons company of the battalion was transformed into a provisional rifle company to increase the battalion's street presence.

The last modification was the commander himself. He had accepted the mantle of local government for his governate, and realized he needed to exercise this responsibility with some good old-fashioned politicking. This equated to a daily grind of meeting local leaders, visiting key sites and infrastructure, observing neighborhood meetings, and ensuring he was perceived as a physical presence and a sign of stability. He compared this role with behaving like an incumbent in an election year, meeting "constituents," and pressing flesh and kissing babies. It was not natural, but the results were positive. Interestingly, this same commander felt that he and his command were well prepared for their mission overall, but that if he had a chance to do it all over again, he could have used a week following a U.S. mayor around before becoming one literally under fire. "I would break out Machiavelli, our Constitution/ Articles of Confederation/Federalist Papers, *Small Wars Manual*, and any reference I could find about running cities and operating in the political realm."[24]

Instead of ignoring the existing power structures, Conlin initiated direct contact and linked up from the start with the political/religious parties to form coalitions based on mutual goals. He did this despite warnings that he would be "legitimizing 'high-threat' groups." But instead he felt he could win over potential enemies by coopting them. The results suggest he was successful. By maximizing interaction with the center of gravity, the local population, via saturation patrols, civic projects, media, and key social/political/religious groups, he generated a degree of trust and understanding

[23] Satellite or saturation patrolling techniques were absorbed by the Marine Corps from British insights on urban warfare, and were incorporated into the Marine Corps Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) program.

[24] Conlin, op. cit, p. 79.

that won out over initial suspicions and chaos. In Conlin's words, "We went into Najaf in April 2003 and fought city from within—or inside out. We left five months later with no losses to enemy fire and with a governate stable enough to allow us to regularly patrol a foot without body armor. We had a 90 percent approval rating at that time."[25] Other senior leaders were equally satisfied, stressing that they established security and did not lose any Marines to hostile fire.[26]

OIF II Operational Summary

In the fall of 2003, I MEF was informed that it would redeploy to Iraq once again as part of the subsequent stability operations. This time the Marines were able to prepare for the complex nature of their assignment and adapt their campaign plans, organization, and tactics to the chaotic insurgency that was growing inside Iraq.

SASO training package

The U.S. Marine Corps' earlier experiences and ramp-up for OIF I were brought to bear quickly. The Marines intensified their cultural training and their investment in language classes, with more than 4,000 Marines graduating from short Arabic immersion courses. When the Division began thinking of the predeployment training program needed to return to Iraq as part of OIF II, they elected to employ an infantry with a large cadre of OIF veterans as the training platform on which to design and conduct the Division's training. Under the command of LtCol Woody Woodbridge, 1/7 Marines was tasked with planning and supporting a SASO training package for all units at the Twentynine Palms, Calif. base identified to deploy for OIF II-1. Woodbridge developed squad-platoon level collective tasks, conditions, and clear, objective standards for the major mission sets of SASO: urban dismounted patrolling, mounted patrolling/convoy operations, vehicle checkpoints, and entry control points, and quick-reaction force drills. The package was developed on a "hear (classes), see (demonstrations), do (plan/rehearse/execute), debrief, and remediate" model. The Marines of 1/7 served as primary instructors, demonstrators, controllers, and evaluators; they also provided all training support safety vehicles, drivers, corpsmen, admin/safety radio operators for the training.[27]

During the months of December-January, 1/7 put the equivalent of 170 rifle squads through a two-week package based on the collective tasks, associated immediate

[25] Email from Col. Christopher Conlin to the author, Mar. 14, 2006.

[26] Ultimately, the 25,000 Marines of I MEF lost only one Marine to any form of hostile action from the end of Major Combat Operations to their withdrawal in October, 2003. Toolan interview.

[27] Email from LtCol Woody Woodbridge to the author, Mar. 7, 2006,

action drills, and emphasizing individual and unit continuing actions—particularly pre-combat checks, pre-combat inspections, operations orders and rehearsals. Training areas in Twentynine Palms were expanded and adapted to more closely represent Iraqi towns and increase the urban realism of the training. The success of this program led to its expansion and adoption as the Division's SASO package. General Mattis was instrumental in garnering Corps-level support to facilitate the training—and the role 1/7 played for Regimental Combat Team 7 was taken up by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) for all units deploying to Iraq. [28]

Cultural Awareness. The culture training was expanded and made mandatory for all Marines, with each Marine getting one full day of basic cultural factors/considerations. An additional package was required for small-unit leaders (Cpl-Capt) and another two-day seminar conducted for senior battalion/regimental and division staff members. In addition a language course was offered for selected Marines. Commanders strived to get a few Marines from each platoon off to a two-week operational Arabic course. Separate contracted instructors taught the language portion of instruction. A contingent of Australians from the MCWL worked at Matilda Village as observer/controllers.[29]

[28] TECOM has also designed and begun a significant investment in training infrastructure and ranges. Much of this focuses on rigorous urban and convoy operations training packages at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. Marine rifle battalions and combat-support personnel deploying to Iraq now have a realistic training venue to hone their skills and to heighten their readiness for the complexities of stability operations. A demanding 30-day training evolution has been designed to prepare combat units for deployment. This exercise expanding on the Marines' traditional live-fire combined arms event of the past. Known as *Mojave Viper*, this exercise combines urban and live-fire events, along with stability operations and cultural awareness drills. Aided by Iraqi civilian contractors and other role players, the regimen provides enormous realism by introducing time constraints and fleeting targets of opportunity instead of scripted scenarios to resolve. In consideration of the increasingly dense nature of modern urban areas, the Marines have developed a 125-building urban training facility and plan to construct the largest urban training complex in the country.

[29] Since an acute understanding of local culture and languages enables irregular operations, TECOM established the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning in February 2005. The Center employs Marines and civilians with expertise in foreign cultures and regional studies. The center reached several achievements in its initial phase. The first class of new lieutenants with formal training in the operational aspects of foreign cultures graduated, and the center has distributed its first basic tactical language training programs, preparing individuals to serve in Iraq and Africa. The center also helped train the new Foreign Military Training Units, as well as Marines preparing to serve as advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marine Corps University has also incorporated cultural understanding and Arabic language classes into an already crammed but noteworthy educational curriculum. See Hagee testimony, op. cit.

The Marines also adapted their force structure for the coming deployment, making up for a lack of military manpower by tasking one of its artillery battalions with preparing itself to become a Provisional Military Police Battalion to augment the Corps' limited military police assets.[30] They also requested additional Army augments for civil affairs and for Tactical PsyOps units. To add bench strength, each battalion reassigned their own officers to add IO and civil affairs personnel.[31]

Planning the Campaign

During OIF II, the 1st Marine Division employed an operational design In developing that operational design General Mattis, began with an assessment of the people his Marines and Sailors would encounter within his division's AO. The division fully understood that both the human terrain and physical terrain of its next AO was distinctly different from their previous tour in Iraq. During OIF I, the division had operated among a cleric-led Shia population. The division's AO during OIF II was in western Iraq/Al Anbar Province, with a considerably different demographic context because it was largely inhabited by Sunni Arabs.

The political and security context was also dramatically different. The 1st Marine Division, based on insights and contacts with their Army brethren realized that the situation in the Sunni Triangle was now a "mature adversarial relationship."[32] The insurgency had now taken form, its leadership was networked, it was gathering intelligence and material support, and it was planning attacks. The insurgents were classified into three basic groups: the *tribes*, the *former regime elements*, and the *foreign fighters*.

The *tribes* constituted the primary identity group in western Iraq/Al Anbar Province. They had various internal tribal affiliations and looked to a diverse array of sheiks, and elders for leadership. The *former regime elements* were a large Sunni minority with personal, political, business and professional ties to the Baath Party, including senior civil servants and career military generals with experience in running government institutions. Initially, this group would see little to gain from a free and democratic Iraq. The *foreign fighters* were a small but volatile minority of transnational Islamic jihadists. Each group had a different set of objectives, leadership, and operational system. To be successful, U.S. forces had to apply a different approach to each of

[30] Col. Thomas Connally and LtCol Lance McDaniel, "Leaving the Tubes at Home," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Oct. 2005, pp. 31–34.

[31] Email from LtCol Woody Woodbridge to author, Mar. 15, 2006.

[32] Mattis interview, Mar. 11, 2006.

these groups within the framework of an overarching plan. General Mattis established an operational design composed of three elements.

The first element, and the main effort, was *diminishing support for insurgency*. The objective of this component was to establish a secure local environment for the indigenous population so that they could pursue their economic, social, cultural and political well-being and achieve some degree of "normalcy." This was defined in relative terms, given the nature of the society and the turbulence of the past few years. Creating this secure environment involved both offensive and defensive combat operations with a heavy emphasis on training and advising the security forces of the fledgling Iraqi government. It also included putting the population to work—"jobs, jobs, jobs" was hammered into the planning equation at several points. Crudely stated, an Iraqi with a job was less likely to succumb to ideological or economic pressure to support the insurgency. There were many stories of otherwise neutral Iraqis planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at night for a few weeks' salary. Promotion of governance and improved economic development were also elements of this aspect of the campaign design, all geared towards increasing employment opportunities and furthering the establishment of local normalcy. Essentially, diminishing support for insurgency was about gaining and maintaining the support of the tribes, as well as converting as many of the former regime members as possible. Not everyone was viewed as a spoiler, the gray zone of the population sitting between hostility or support was the center of gravity to be secured. "Fence-sitters" were considered a winnable constituency.[33]

The second element involved *neutralizing the bad actors,* a combination of irreconcilable former regime elements and foreign fighters. Offensive combat operations were conducted to defeat former regime members who remained in violent opposition to a democratic government. At no time was the annihilation of this discrete component of the population sought. The task was to make those who were not killed outright see the futility of resistance and give up the fight. With respect to the hard-core extremists, who would never give up the fight, the task was more straightforward: their complete and utter destruction. The ability to neutralize the bad actors was a supporting effort because it improved the local security environment and generated credibility and momentum for the nascent Iraqi government. Neutralization had to be accomplished in a discriminate manner, however, in order to avoid unintentionally increasing support for insurgency. Training, including rules of engagement and law of war training, stressed the importance of discriminate actions and individual accountability.

[33] Ibid.

The third element was an overarching *information operations*. This component generated a "bodyguard of truthful information" to all the Blue Diamond was doing on behalf of the Coalition. Information operations, proactive and responsive, were aggressively employed to favorably influence the populace's perception of all coalition actions while simultaneously discrediting the insurgents. This was not an easy task given the inherent distrust in the new government and the wariness generated by the presence of an army from a Christian nation. The magnitude of that distrust highlighted the critical importance of using information operations to influence every situation.

Operations

When the Marines returned to Iraq in March 2004, they had hoped to apply some time-tested principles reflected from Corps' extensive experience with insurgencies in Latin America captured in the classical *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 and from Vietnam. Mixing a nuanced understanding of culture and psychology, the Marines planned to provide "carrots" that would divide the silent majority of Iraqi civilians from the Baath diehards and jihadists swarming from Syria, down the Euphrates to the Sunni Triangle. At the same time, the credible capacity to apply "sticks" by force of arms would remain the iron fist inside the velvet glove. The 1st Marine Division, led again by then-Major General Mattis, was prepared to apply the lessons of OIF I and the intensive pre-deployment training regimen that emphasized the cultural awareness and non-kinetic aspects of stability and support operations.

The brutal ambush and subsequent mutilation of four U.S. citizens in Fallujah on March 31 undercut the Marines' desired approach. On April 2 the Marines were ordered to enter the volatile city, 35 miles west of Baghdad, and find and punish the perpetrators of the ghastly attack. Without time to conduct insert human intelligence assets or sensors, conduct any formal reconnaissance, augment the available force with reinforcements, or to shape the battlespace. The Marines dutifully shrugged their shoulders and isolated Fallujah, a city of 250,000, on April 5. The assault element was comprised of just two battalions (1/5 and 2/1), reinforced by tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, and light armored vehicles.

On April 7, the Marine force pushed forward into the dense city to begin Operation Vigilant Resolve. They quickly seized a large industrial area. This allowed the Marines to establish a presence inside the city, while working with friendly Iraqi elements to try to find a more precise means of identifying and fixing the insurgents responsible for the grisly ambush. The former regime elements and Arab insurgents who had been hiding inside the city put up a stiff resistance, with one counterattack successfully blunting a Marine patrol, producing ten casualties. The attackers did not evidence any

grasp of basic tactics or marksmanship, but what they lacked in experience they made up with reckless zeal.

Just as quickly as the Marines were ordered into the town, they were ordered to stop and reverse themselves. Apparently, political leaders in Washington had never appreciated the international political and media impact of ordering the Marines into such a tense situation. The imagery of the Marines' dogged attack and collateral damage in a city packed with noncombatants was not anticipated, and no one was prepared for the political blowback. The Marines again shrugged their shoulders, and withdrew to the edge of the city, muttering about indecisiveness back at home.[34] The operation confirmed the growing appreciation gained by the Marine leadership that the conditions of 2004 were dramatically different than the context they faced in 2003, and that a significant shift in tactics would be required to tampon down the insurgent virus. A major element of that component of the strategy required a greater emphasis on training the Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi Police.

Training Local Forces

The Marine Corps has always understood that the training of indigenous forces is a crucial aspect of any effective counterinsurgency strategy. Its *Small Wars Manual* gives solid advice on the careful selection of local officers and troops for constabulary duties.[35] Several predeployment exercises highlighted the need to incorporate this training into the Division's planning. One option for improving Iraqi operational effectiveness was the creation of a program employed by the Marines in Vietnam known as the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program, with U.S. soldiers and Marines living among the Iraqi people, training together, and conducting joint U.S.-Iraqi security patrols. Another option for improving cross training with the new Iraqi military was to put U.S. advisors with Iraqi units, another throwback to Vietnam.

In Vietnam, the use of CAPs was predicated on a carefully screened, somewhat specially trained, combat-experienced rifle squad of Marine volunteers, plus a corpsman, with an approximately platoon-sized indigenous security force (Popular Force). Although it was not fully resourced or appreciated at the time, the program

[34] On the first drive into Fallujah, the best source is Bing West, *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah*, New York: Bantam Books, 2005. See also F. G. Hoffman, "The Marines in Review: 2004," *Naval Institute Proceedings,* May 2005.

[35] Chapter 12 of the *Small Wars Manual* details the organization and training of Armed Native Organizations. "Members of the United States forces serving with constabulary must possess good judgment and extreme patience, coupled with tact, firmness, justice and control." ch. 12-23, p. 19.

proved to be a very effective means of securing the local populace while simultaneously denying the Vietcong any permanent sanctuary or means of support.[36]

In OIF II, the 1st Marine Division employed a "hybrid" CAP concept, with mixed success.[37] Each battalion was required to assign and train one platoon for CAP duty. The CAP element was considered by senior officers to have been fully successful, albeit limited due to the constraints on forces. Depending on the tactical situation, some CAP elements served largely as training advisors. Other lived, ate, and fought with their Iraqi counterparts, apart from their parent unit and away from the well-defended American cantonments. "Living with their counterparts and sharing all duties and dangers with them, this common bond facilitated communications and understanding, enabling both cultures to solve the complex problems faced in combat."[38]

This sense of shared risk and danger is a key aspect of the training/advisory role. Because of force limitations, the Division was required to pull battalions to meet increased needs in other areas. This had a deleterious impact on the CAP program and the tight relationship and sense of trust that was required for these units to be effective. Some battalions had to withdraw their CAP unit out of their assigned areas in order to reinforce the Division's priorities in places like Fallujah. [39] That broke the trust bonds established between the CAP and the inexperienced police force left behind to combat a lethal insurgency by themselves. Other battalions left their CAP platoons in place just to preclude this problem, and the Division compensated elsewhere with Special Operations Force detachments where available. Units that returned after a gap in the CAP commitment tried to fill in, but those units eventually also left their assigned co-units behind to support Operation Al Fajr (Fallujah II) and never returned. Such efforts undercut the trust that needs to be built and carefully nurtured in these sorts of operations.

[36] For a discussion on CAPs in Vietnam, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam,* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp. 172-77; and Major Curtis L. Williamson, USMC, "The U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP): A Proposed Alternative Strategy for Vietnam," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va., 1999.

[37] The term "hybrid" was detailed by Col. Toolan (Toolan interview).

[38] Lt. Col. Willard A. Buhl, "Strategic Small Unit Leaders," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan. 2006, p. 54.

[39] Major Kevin Norton, "The 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment's Operations in Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette,* May 2005.

Many of the Marines involved in this mission were extremely proud of their accomplishments.[40] Senior leaders claim it was a success, "hands down."[41] But others noted that the Marine Corps could do better, that they got little support from the Coalition and actually dug into their own pockets to provide the Iraqis some basic gear.[42] In addition to the breadth of the challenge, the insurgents conducted a simple intimidation campaign, targeting Iraqi policemen or soldiers on their trips home, which proved to be a great problem.[43] Many of the assigned CAP Marines were young and only on their first enlistments. They had insufficient language training, proficiency in foreign weapons, and instruction on indigenous culture. They had little grasp themselves about how to train foreign forces in the midst of an insurgency.

From their experiences in Iraq, the Marine Corps has learned, once again, the importance of highly prepared and skilled trainers and advisers as a key component of effective counterinsurgency. Since security of the population is the biggest challenge facing the coalition, and the reliance on an apparent occupation force counterproductive, then establishment of an effective Iraqi security force is the number one priority. Realizing the possibility of more insurgencies developing in strategic third-world countries, the Marine Corps is now sending formally organized and trained teams of Marines to provide counterinsurgency instruction for these nations' security forces. Small teams of Marines, serving as part of what are referred to as Mobile or Embedded Training Teams (MTT or ETT) in Afghanistan and Iraq, have been training and/or conducting operations alongside each nation's security forces to help defeat the ongoing insurgencies. The MTTs are small teams of Marines embedded with Afghan or Iraqi security forces to help these units train and fight. These teams have varied in size, skill sets, and the length of time deployed. Heretofore the MTTs have been hastily formed, comprised of Marines spread around the country, and sent into their missions with limited guidance and little to no formal training. Personnel assigned to MTTs normally receive temporary assignment duty orders, operate as a member of the team for six months to a year, and then return to their parent units. Some teams get to prepare as a cohesive team for a short time, other *teams had first*

[40] On efforts to model Vietnam era CAPs in Iraq, see 1stLt Zachary J. Iscol, "CAP India," *Marine Corps Gazette,* January 2006, pp. 54-60; LtCol Philip C. Skuta, "Introduction to 2/7 CAP Platoon Actions in Iraq," and "Partnering With Iraqi Security Forces," and 1stLts Jason Goodale and Jon Webre, USMC, "The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette,* April 2005, pp. 35-42.

[41] Toolan interview.

[42] Tyson Belanger, "The Cooperative Will of War," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan 2006, pp. 62-64.

[43] Major Lois J. Palazzo, "To Build a Nation's Army," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec. 2005, pp. 35-37; Belanger, p. 63.

introductions occur in-country.[44] Their predeployment training has been basic military skills, but lacking unique language and cultural knowledge they need to be effective.

The Marines recognized the growing importance of these missions and formalized their tasks into a standing and trained Foreign Military Training Unit.[45] This unit is part of a larger initiative to increase the Marine Corps' support and involvement with the U.S. Special Operations Command. The commander of the new unit was blunt when commenting on his task: "We're getting away from the pick-up team that goes in and conducts this training, to having guys that live, eat and breathe it full time and that's what they do for a living."[46]

Perspectives on Transition Operations

The key issue in the initial postconflict phase of OIF was the so-called transition period as U.S. forces finished major combat operations and began stability and security operations. Overall, the transition to stability operations could have been better coordinated on a number of different levels. Transitioning was not easy at any level from tired squad leaders who were in close contact with civilians and former soldiers to senior officers suddenly confronted with new responsibilities and new relationships.[47]

Initial plans to transition combat operations to stability and support operations relied heavily upon external interagency assistance from OHRA (later CPA) to prepare and execute this phase of the operation. Many Marine leaders asked about this assumption and were always assured that they did not have to concern themselves with this challenge. However, when interagency personnel were not available to assist, Marine and Army units were required to execute all aspects of these missions. "All the sudden

[44] Cited by Captain Cuomo from his interview with an ETT AOIC sent to Afghanistan in March 2006 without ever having met twelve of the fourteen Marines on his team. Captain Scott Cuomo, "It's Time to Make ETTs the Main Effort," *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 2006.

[45] These units or FMTUs will deploy to countries that may be future breeding grounds for transnational insurgents, and preempt the formation of a larger problem down the road. An FMTU was activated on Oct. 7, 2005, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The unit's task organization calls for over 430 Marines, built around a headquarters element and 24 deployable training teams. Once assigned to the FMTU, most Marines and sailors are broken into squad-sized elements and undergo at least six months of training. This training provides the basic skills, and special education on foreign languages, cultural awareness, and counterinsurgency operations.

[46] See "Marines' Foreign Military Training Unit Awaits First Deployment," available at www.fmtukvn.org.

[47] LtCol Lance A. McDaniel, "Transitioning From Conventional Combat," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Nov. 2005, pp. 52-53.

I was the mayor of eight cities. . . . I had no idea I would be responsible for getting the water running, turning on the electricity, and running an economy."[48]

This challenge is not entirely foreign to the U.S. military, given its experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but it is not entirely comfortable or shaped for the specific functions required. In particular, U.S. military forces were not resourced or trained to manage large municipal areas, large-scale infrastructure repairs, establish law and order, or provide large-scale training and advisory functions. These issues must be addressed and further defined in order to more effectively prepare for and execute future operations. This is at the center of U.S. government efforts to better prepare for what are now referred to as Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Ops.[49] These efforts include an initiative inside the U.S. State Department that has the support of the Marine Corps.[50]

There is a limited window of opportunity to implement an effective transition and set a good foundation for the future. If the strategic transition is not carefully planned and effectively executed, a significant power vacuum will appear, as the massive looting in Panama in 1989 and in Iraq in 2003 showed. Popular support is the center of gravity during transition operations. Once lost, it is extremely difficult to regain. As a complex social system, we should not be surprised to see populations in major towns evolve to fill that vacuum. Thus, Muqtada Sadr arose largely because he created a support mechanism for a distinct constituency, the poor. A major lesson to draw from Iraq is that after a short time, which some referred to as the Golden Hour, local elements will begin to fill any vacuum to their benefit. The Golden Hour is that period of time (days, weeks, possibly months) where U.S. forces can gain the initiative during transition and stabilization operation. Efforts by local elements may or may not be in concert with local or American interests. Where interests are similar, the transition is much easier but where interests diverge, poor planning or bad execution of the transition permits local forces to seize a foothold. This can be further destabilizing and increases the difficulty of reestablishing order and services.

---

[48] Marine Colonel following "major combat operations" in Iraq, interviewed by Dr. Janine Davidson, cited in her Four-Block War presentation, pp. cit.

[49] U.S. Defense Department, DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," Nov. 28, 2005. This directive captures the institutional corrective measures being undertaken to respond to the Phase IV failures made in Iraq in 2003.

[50] This support was reiterated by comments made by both Gen. Mike Hagee and Lt. Gen. James Mattis at the Marine hosted Irregular Warfare Conference, *Irregular Warfare 2 Conference Report,* August 2005.

The U.S. military did not anticipate or appreciate the general chaos that would occur across all segments of society upon the toppling of the Hussein autocracy. During this period, many commanders did attempt to seize the initiative and effectively manage the ensuing chaos. The first priority was to quickly reestablish the rule of law. Maslow's hierarchy of needs was sometimes cited as particularly relevant here.[51] Physical safety needs are paramount, and alleviating any chaotic conditions allowed local commanders to initially garner respect and working relationships with local people and their elites. High-impact, rapid-result civil affairs projects are needed to start the ball rolling with the local population. But such projects should meet an actual need, and not be conducted merely because they can be done. Building credibility and good will through such projects in turn allowed commanders to influence the creation of a new power structure and expand their efforts to build upon the secure environment in order to improve essential services and the local economy.

Key commanders believe that effective transitions may be the decisive event of future campaigns. Even when there is no doubt during major combat about ultimate victory, poor execution of the transition to stability operations can cause major issues. Combat units and commanders involved in the initial phases of the operation must be mentally and physically prepared to begin the transition to stability operations immediately upon cessation of hostilities. Planning staffs must recognize and keep in mind the ultimate end state sought by higher authority. Phase III combat operations may have to be conducted with Phase IV challenges in mind. Military expediency should not cloud out the ultimate aim sought in the overall operation. After regime removal, coalition forces must be prepared to immediately assume all functions associated with governance. This includes key infrastructure, critical services, law and order, economy, politics, and especially information operations. IO equates to influence during transition. A capability must exist to both inform and influence the local population 24/7. This capability is also critical in countering the IO of elements in the society that may be hostile to the coalition presence.

For many commanders, the challenge was one of education and preparation. Some found the challenge to be unique and extremely doable.[52] Not many were ready to become mayors and governors. One commander noted that instead of some of the combat training he had undergone, he wished he had simply spent a week with the mayor of his local town back at home.

> Many of the commanders in Iraq spent up to 60-70 percent of their time running a city or

[51] U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars/21st Century*, Quantico, VA: Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, 2003 edition, p. 47.

[52] Col. Carl "Sam" Mundy, email to the author, 30 March 2006.

> province. They were the mayor, the police chief, the city administrator, and the school principal rolled into one. If these types of peacekeeping missions are going to be a reoccurring assignment, US commanders need a broader skill set. Skills should include training in civil affairs, debating techniques, public affairs, governance, and public speaking.[53]

For the individual soldier or Marine, much of the transition challenge is a matter of the proper mind-set. The soldier or Marine who has been shooting at people one minute must be trained to become more restrained and assume the role of a peacekeeper the next. This situation is made doubly difficult by the fact that young troops may be required to go through this transition from combat to stability operations and back again numerous times. The mental discipline and agility to do this, while losing friends to casualties is easily underestimated. "This is not a new challenge, but is one we have not always addressed well."[54]

For the Marine Corps as an institution, the major issue involves the task organization required to effectively complete the entire operation, not just Phase III. Postconflict operations placed a premium on different skill sets than Phase III, and additional forces were lacking to pick up the slack from those units that had initially raced from Kuwait to Baghdad. An effective task organization for Phase IV operations must include infrastructure repair capabilities, civil administrative capabilities like judiciary or court systems, and law enforcement capabilities and funding. These are "non-traditional" military skill-sets, but they are critical during transition and include military police, engineer, medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations units. Many of these skill sets exist in the flexible Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), but perhaps not in the depth necessary for long-term stability challenges or protracted counterinsurgency operations.

What was utterly lacking was not a military unprepared for chaos, but the sheer lack of interagency planning and coordination. Transition operations require extensive interagency planning and coordination. This includes a clearly defined and integrated chain-of-command, communication capabilities, and a common operating picture for both military and other U.S. government units and agencies. The U.S. government did not have the doctrine or training to do this in the immediate aftermath of OIF.

Perspectives on Unique Capabilities

Civil-Military Operations

Postconflict operations differ in part by the degree to which the commander must

[53] Conlin interview, Mar. 14, 2006.
[54] Ibid.

consider the civil dimension of military operations. Most transition operations and counterinsurgency efforts will focus on what are called Civil Military Operations (CMO) since the civilian populace may be the center of gravity. In these stability operations, CMO may be the most decisive MAGTF "maneuver" in another dimension. In fact, in these non-traditional operations, the role of CMO is crucial to success, and the ability to interface with national and local governments, coordinate with aid and relief agencies, and support the needs of the population is central to any strategy. Not surprisingly, one senior CAG officer stressed "Everything we do here at the MEF has a CMO component…. Everything." [55]

The Marine Corps defines CMO as:

> The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of the local, regional or national government.[56]

This definition only varies slightly from the formal Joint definition. It is distinctive in that it does identify more than relationships and it explicitly incorporates the execution of traditional civil governmental functions.

The Marine Corps relies on its civil affairs units to accomplish this mission. It has two permanent CAGs, both of which are Marine Corps Reserve units: 3rd CAG at Camp Pendleton, and 4th CAG at Anacostia Naval Station, Washington, D.C. Each CAG deployed twice during OIF I and II. Major Marine headquarters do not have billets for civil affairs staff personnel. During OIF II, 1st Marine Division established a G-X staff section to provide an 8-person civil affairs staff for planning and coordination. Each CAG is organized around civil affairs detachments of a few dozen Marines. Civil affairs detachments were assigned direct support missions to each of the MEF subcommands (Division, Wing, and Marine Logistics Group).

Because its capability is essentially in a demobilized status in the Marine Corps Reserve, many commanders and Marines had little exposure to civil affairs personnel or doctrine prior to deploying. However, most Marine staffs were familiar with civil affairs and humanitarian/disaster relief requirements and knew how to incorporate

[55] Attributed to Col. John Ballard, CO 4th CAG, who served in Fallujah during the Nov. 2004 battle.

[56] U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3-30.3, Civil Military Operations, Quantico, Va., 2003.

these requirements into planning cycles. However, many organizational commanders were not as prepared as they might have been. Some did not anticipate being the mayor of a large urban area, responsible for basic services.[57] Too many Marines had emphasized the kinetic and combat portions of their profession but lacked the broader understanding of the complexities of transitions. As one Infantry Battalion executive officer put it, "Most of what we do over here is civil affairs stuff. We spend more time on building relations with the local community than we do in actual combat. The problem is that we have to learn as we go."[58]

With a consistently high demand for civil affairs, and given the nature of the mission in OIF II, civil affairs units were in greater demand than could be met with the Marine Corps existing force structure. In order to enable the permanent CAGs to re-constitute after their deployments, two temporary, provisional civil affairs units were established. The provisional CAGs were created by taking preexisting, Reserve units, augmenting them with civil affairs-qualified Marines, including at the command level, and providing basic predeployment civil affairs training to the members of the provisional units. These units were essentially "workarounds" designed to mitigate the great demand for civil affairs units. The new units experienced difficulty in finding qualified personnel with the necessary civilian related skills. A significant degree of attrition of experienced civil affairs operators, loss of valuable civilian expertise and insufficient time to reconstitute to ensure experience and skills would be fully replenished. 3d and 4th CAG commanders were forced to supplement their depleted ranks with non-civil affairs personnel, with limited opportunity to recruit for civilian skills relevant to CMO in Iraq.

The resulting provisional units performed adequately, but numerous issues have been raised since OIF II to adjust Marine civil affairs capabilities. Exacerbating the personnel problems raised by a protracted conflict, and a capability maintained entirely within the Marine Reserve, is the fact that civil affairs training is dependent largely on a reliance on U.S. Army training slots at their civil affairs school. Additional training seats were hard to acquire as both Services ramped up special skills training in areas in high demand for counterinsurgency operations. Accordingly, the Marine Corps conducted its own training courses "in-house" to supplement the few available Army slots.

The lack of higher guidance was a recognized problem in this dimension. There was no "master plan" or even broad commander's guidance for CMO activities during OIF

[57] Marine Colonel following "major combat operations" in Iraq, interviewed by Dr. Janine Davidson, cited in her Four-Block War brief.

[58] Unnamed Marine officer, cited in SCETC CMO brief, in author's possession.

II, even though the Coalition force had been in Iraq for nearly a year. The plan developed during 3rd CAG's predeployment time became a casualty to the realities of an increasingly high threat environment in the Sunni Triangle. The absence of clear guidance also resulted in poor, "feel-good" project selection. "We have built so many schools that the Iraqis don't need. You know what happens to them? They get blown up, because no teachers show up, because no students come, no books are there, the Muj walks in, they blow them up. It happens time and again, we give them something they don't ask for, they don't need, because it's something we can do."[59] According to several senior officers, the lack of an overarching CMO plan or set of priorities from either CENTCOM or the Joint Land Force Commander, coupled with a thin, inexperienced civil affairs force, required maneuver commanders to develop and execute their own plans for reconstruction.

The early drive into Fallujah in April 2004 offset the MEFs carefully developed "velvet glove" approach, as well as generating greater resistance to U.S. forces throughout the Sunni triangle. The order to enter Fallujah in April 2004 was generated by the provocation created by the heinous murder of four American contractors in late March just as the First Marine Division was arriving and getting settled into its new AO. The combat operation into the heart of the Sunni province made the CMO burden even harder, which produced some key lessons for Marines.

There were many comments made about the size of the Marine Civil Affairs component, a reflection on total capacity. As one senior staff officer commented: "We went back with an anemic Civil Affairs force…we needed much greater numbers of civil administrators." A regimental commander warned, "We can't keep throwing together teams of civil affairs." Referring to the CMO demands that followed the November 2004 operations in Fallujah, one officer stated: "The civil affairs mission was too big for the CAG…. Civil Affairs did not have the manpower for its missions…. It had to be done…. By default, infantry units did it." Even after Fallujah II, there was "no clear civil affairs plan for reconstruction … [w]e planned and the CAG executed." While planning during the early stages of the second Fallujah operation was "chaotic," it improved considerably in the weeks following the stand-up of the CMOC by the CAG.

Some Marine commanders and senior staff officers found that their civil affairs Marines were enthusiastic but less than fully effective. While the Marine Corps has appropriate civil affairs doctrine, few civil affairs Marines have a chance to routinely

[59] The author heard this same comment numerous times during field trips to Iraq, and often stunned commanders who were citing their school construction projects when asked exactly who asked for the building and how it was to be equipped and supported.

deploy with and train with their active duty counterparts, and thus the active force has little conception of what civil affairs brings to the fight, and the Reserve Civil Affairs Marines have little understanding of how to incorporate their expertise into major staff plans. Many Civil Affairs Marines by 2004 were as new to CMO as the senior staff officers were, and the senior Marine commanders had little experience with civil affairs doctrine. Some leaders also complained that the subject matter expertise that they'd come to expect from past operations was missing. Furthermore, they felt that the Marines were lacking skills and expertise in relevant civilian areas such as commerce, governance, and engineering. Law or law enforcement skills were found to be adequate to the task. Leaders made specific reference to certain areas of expertise that need to be maintained in the CAGs: business development, civil engineering, municipal government, public works, public health, project management, justice, and food-water-fuel distribution.[60]

A major lesson learned was the need to exploit civil affairs expertise into the broader plan for counterinsurgency operations. Marine planners recognize now that planning for reconstruction and transition of an indigenous civilian government necessitates a cohesive, strategic CMO plan within the Marine AO. Such a plan should synchronize the efforts of civil affairs and non-civil affairs units, and be consistent with higher guidance from military and government direction. A related lesson is the need to broaden the subject matter expertise of Marine civil affairs community which was not organized to plan and conduct long-term nation-building efforts. This will require Marines with appropriate skills or advance coordination with other U.S. government agencies or the Iraqi government to provide such expertise.

The Marine Corps has reviewed its civil affairs structure in light of OIF and elected to increase its Reserve strength by adding one new detachment to each Reserve CAG. More critically, active duty Civil Affairs planner billets are being established at MEF, Division and Force Service Support Group Headquarters staffs to provide permanent staff expertise from a broader civil affairs community into major staff planning events. Additionally, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has tasked the Marine artillery community to absorb the civil affairs mission as a secondary role for all Marine artillerymen. This will require them to conduct additional training, but also allows active duty personnel to begin thinking in terms of phasing in civil affairs operations during transition ops in Phase IV with Marines who are already present, trained, and situationally aware but whose combat mission may now be entirely gone. The cross-training of artillery units as CAGs also brings other benefits including availability for immediate use instead of the Reserve CAGs, which must be mobilized by the

[60] U.S. Marine Corps, *Civil Military Operations OIF II Report*, Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Lessons Learned Center, Nov. 2005. (Principal author Col A. Sinnott, USMCR).

Pentagon. Another advantage is the active artillery community is well-versed in Marine Corps planning and staffing processes. This turned out to be critical during OIF I. However, other Marines have noted that the use of active duty personnel does not bring to bear the highly relevant civilian skills and expertise of the Reserve CAGs, as would the ability to relate and respond to local nationals from the perspective of reservists who have spent considerable time living and working in the civilian world.[61]

Given the nature of the Marines' expeditionary missions, the CAGs had developed a repertoire of skills built around short duration missions requiring coordination with local officials and with NGOs. The organizational capabilities of the CAGs were never designed to handle some missions it is now conducting, specifically, nation-building and reconstruction. This will sharply alter their composition and the training of civil affairs units in the future. One observer of commented:

> How the CAGs are to be used by I MEF must be clarified. Marine Corps Civil Affairs units are neither trained, structured nor equipped for employment in lengthy post-hostilities or 'nation-building' scenarios. If this is a trend in future employment, the T/O, T/E, and training must be modified to accomplish this mission.[62]

This will also require a change in attitude by the active duty Marine Corps, which requires a distinction between CMO and civil affairs personnel. As one seasoned CAG commander noted:

> The problem is that we think of CMO as something that the CAG does. We are all more comfortable with kinetic operations, so that's what we focus on and then leave the detailed planning for Phase IV operations to the civil affairs guys, who often lack the background and expertise to make it work. We do this even though we all say that Phase IV is the most important phase.[63]

The final lesson is the need to ensure that civil affairs personnel achieve a higher level capability in operational culture and foreign languages. This will ensure that Marine CMO is fully capable, across the full spectrum of operations, and at all levels of war.[64]

---

[61] Details can be found in ALMAR 61/05 of 5 Dec 2005 from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, at www.marines.mil.

[62] Quoted in the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Center Civil Military Operations study.

[63] A Marine planner cited in Security Cooperation and Training Center presentation.

[64] For additional deep insights into initiatives and ideas for enhancing Marine CMO see Michael M. Walker, "Marine Civil Affairs and the GWOT," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 2006, pp. 74-78.

Information Operations

IO involves actions taken to affect an enemy's information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems in order to achieve specific objectives.[65] The focus of IO is on the individual decision-makers and the decision-making process, to degrade, influence, or paralyze their ability to understand the situation or respond effectively. IO is the ability to adversely influence enemy decision making processes while enhancing and protecting our own. Cultural training is considered an essential foundation for effective IO, especially in the counter-insurgency environment. The success of tactical and operational IO depends on the ability to "influence" the noncombatant population. Influence cannot be achieved without a thorough understanding of the local culture.

Senior Marine leaders placed a premium on the role of the psychological dimension of the transition period and the counterinsurgency phase. Information operations at a strategic level are "how you dry up the swamp that's festering [in] this plague," General Mattis said in an interview.[66] U.S. military leaders have for years called for stepped-up IO campaigns—efforts to cultivate public support and deny insurgents or terrorists an ability to promote their own agendas through disinformation. But, thus far, American attempts at IO have been sporadic and relatively incoherent, Mattis opined.

At the same time, violent extremists in Iraq have become masters at information operations, releasing tapes of hostages to generate public fear and manipulate perceptions, experts note. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that he considers the U.S. strategic communications effort to date in the Global War on Terrorism to have been amateurish at best.[67]

Information operations can be carried out on a tactical level but offer a potentially sweeping effect as larger populations are affected, Mattis noted. "If we don't get information operations right, you could order the Marines into Fallujah and end up ordering them back out again. Because on the information level, the strategic level, we were being misrepresented there," he said. "American broadcasting agencies were using al-Jazeera tapes—because they couldn't get their own people into the city—and the al-Jazeera tapes were not necessarily even filmed inside Fallujah, although they

[65] Joint Publication *Information Operations, A Strategy for Peace-The Decisive Edge in War*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1999, p. 3.

[66] Elaine Grossman, "Mattis, U.S. has barely begun War vs. Jihadis for Global Hearts and Minds," *Inside the Pentagon*, Aug. 25, 2005.

[67] See 17 Feb 2006 transcript at www.cfr.org.

were attributed to being from in there."[68] This lack of access to information, because the U.S. forces chose not to engage, left news outlets completely dependent on one side's perspectives.

On a smaller scale, Mattis described how, in conducting stability operations in 2003, he worked with a priest to hand out water to Iraqis demonstrating against U.S. forces in Najaf. "That's an information operation," Mattis said, "We defused them not with violence but with water."[69] This represents a broader understanding that was very common among Marines that all activities they conducted, whether it was a town council meeting, building a school, or conducting a patrol, was an opportunity to reinforce a message. This message was generally defined by senior commanders as their principal IO theme.[70]

But because the Marine Corps has *no* organic PsyOps units and no organic equipment for disseminating products or broadcasts, the ability to apply well-designed IO campaigns was limited. The Marines were augmented with U.S. Army units, and the Marines appear to have been satisfied with their capabilities and performance. The author's field interviews indicated general satisfaction with the ability of Marine staffs to incorporate an information component into their plans and operations.[71] But at least one commander found himself limited in trying to communicate within a fairly large city during the transition phase to a large and varied population. He thought:

> For example, our PsyOps teams needed the capability to immediately saturate the local media with our message but could not do it because all they had were loudspeakers and leaflets. They need portable radio/television transmitters in transition/stability operations. You can lead a population but only if you can effectively get your message and personality out to citizens. In urban settings even the poorest have some access to electronic media, and its use provides immediate influence over the population.[72]

Marines did identify the need for more effective communications with the population at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, they desired a multi-targeted information operations plan with targets including the international community, coalition members, the U.S. public, Middle Eastern countries, and Muslims. At the operational level, the focus should be on the Iraqi population—those that support the coalition, those that opposed the coalition, and particularly those

[68] Quoted in Grossman.
[69] Ibid.
[70] U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 3-42. *Information Operations*, Sept. 2003.
[71] Reinforced by email by the Division Information Officer, LtCol R. Olsen, to the author, Oct 20, 2004.
[72] Conlin interview and email of Mar. 14, 2006.

who are still undecided. In this effort it will be necessary to leverage multi-dimensional media—U.S., international, and especially the Iraqi media. Among the concrete information operations identified was the need for a satellite TV outlet that daily shows the resisters killed and captured, with the goal of portraying resistance against the coalition as hopeless. Several commentators want a satellite-based Iraqi forum to counter Al Jazeera. Currently, anti-American spin on American casualties is seen throughout Iraq within five hours after an attack has occurred. This gives the resisters an edge because they have immediate, positive feedback. The coalition had nothing like this, instead it had some elaborate procedures for clearing IO products that consumed too much time and were ineffective by the time they were deployed.

The general consensus indicated there were no theater-wide IO plans available to them as they embarked upon transition and stability operations. Marine staffs create ad hoc IO plans, built around their understanding of the importance of the information contest or war of ideas, but the lack of IO-related resources (mass media capabilities) inhibited the scope and effectiveness of these plans. At the same time, Marine commanders realized that mass communications was just one means, and that other means; including direct face-to-face talks, town meetings, discussions with key leaders, had to impart the same messages and themes.

As stated earlier, IO equates to influence during transition. A capability must exist to both inform and influence the local population 24/7. This capability is also critical in countering the IO of elements in the society that may be hostile to the coalition presence. As time progresses, the IO campaign must adjust and continually seek to reach as many people as possible. This means being able to buy time on local radio stations and local/regional television programs.

A nation that leads the world in mass-media capability should be able to provide like-capabilities to military forces and interagency organizations faced with the IO requirements demanded by three-block war operations. The shaping and broadcasting of information is the heart and soul of the IO plan. Thus local commanders must have access to mass media outlets that the local populace normally uses to obtain information. Essentially this entails civilian radio broadcasting facilities, local TV, newspaper and internet capabilities. The key is to communicate to as many people as possible as quickly as possible in order to influence the situation (and environment).

Feedback and assessment are important elements of the staff process, to advise the commander on the overall impact of his operations. To provide this feedback, IO requires the capability to poll the population. Numerous observers interviewed felt as though they were operating in a vacuum and needed to know what the local inhabitants' priorities and thoughts were on events/issues, etc. Some Army units

attached to the Marines helped conduct these polls. Other subsequent Marine deployments have used contracted third party polling services to enhance accuracy and objectivity.

Because they not have any schooled-trained information officers, the Marines did find it necessary to create and fill billets at major headquarters and down to the battalion level to fill this role. The role of the information officer was called key to operations in this environment, critical to the battalion's success. It should not be regarded as a collateral duty, but it was often was assigned to a Fire-Support or Artillery Coordinator on some staffs. Like with many other unique skills (public affairs, intelligence, and civil affairs), the Marines found that the standard Battalion staff configuration does not lend itself well to the unique demands of day-to-day operations in a contested area like Anbar Province. Counterinsurgency operations demand a heavier emphasis on non-kinetic functions such as intelligence, information and civil military operations. A battalion uses all of these functions in conjunction with kinetic fires in its employment of combined arms.[73] But the battalions often did not have dedicated assets or attachments providing direct support.

The Marine Corps has reviewed its capabilities in this functional area, and believes that its doctrine is sound. However, there has been recognition that this is an area in which more expertise is required for major headquarters staff planning. Thus, the Marine Corps has added a total of nine officer and 17 enlisted billets to its major headquarters to provided dedicated staff personnel for future contingencies. It is anticipated that current capability assessments will closely examine the necessary requirements for a more substantial capacity in this crucial dimension of modern conflict.

[73] Major Joseph Paschall, "Tactical Information Operations in OIF," *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2004, pp. 56-59.

Key Insights

The penultimate section of this study offers several key insights and perspectives that have been derived from the investigation of U.S. Marine efforts before, during, and after OIF I and II.

Plan with the End in Mind

Campaigns should not merely focus on the military aspects, but need to include and be shaped by the end-state defined by political and strategic guidance. Clearly, this did not occur for OIF at the strategic and policy level.[74] Inherent to ongoing efforts within the U.S. military to explore alternative campaign planning constructs and the efforts to establish Stability Operations as the equivalent of warfighting capabilities in its importance to U.S. interests, is the acknowledgement that U.S. planning efforts were incomplete at best. One officer who has been active in the effort to refine U.S. stability operations capabilities and interagency coordination put it this way:

> We need to better plan for actions and effects during the combat phase that will produce the best complement of subsequent transition and stability operations. I think this was attempted in varying degrees by higher and adjacent commands, but there did not seem to be a unity of purpose throughout the theater in defining a cohesive political end state fully supported in all phases of the operation. As a result, I believe that postconflict operations were complicated by how we waged the combat phase.[75]

Comprehensive and Integrated Approach[76]

The need to employ all tools in the national tool chest not just the military is a recurring insight, another lesson relearned at great expense. In particular the gaps in governance, power and services during the golden hour materially contributed to the underlying support for the insurgency. The inability of the U.S. ad hoc administrative mechanisms to get their hands around the most immediate problems and to integrate the significant American and international resources at hand is remarkable given the importance of the assignment to U.S. foreign policy. A commonly heard refrain was a reference to the fact that America could put a man on the moon but could not fix the electrical grid. A "whole of government" approach is needed but sorely lacking. The

[74] Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan: Major Calls Effort in Iraq 'Mediocre'," *Washington Post*, Dec. 25, 2004; Isaiah Wilson, III, "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq, paper delivered at the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, 14 Oct 2004; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq,* New York: Random House, 2006.

[75] Conlin, "What Do You Do for an Encore?" p. 79.

[76] James Fallows, "Why Iraq Has No Army," *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec. 2005.

best summary of the Marine perspective on this challenge is taken from the final conference report for their annual Irregular Warfare conference in July 2005:

> The U.S. needs to significantly bolster its non-military instruments of national power, and improve our ability to integrate these capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This requires a common planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction that would link goals, essential tasks, and institutional responsibility and resources. It will also require new organizational models to deploy interagency planning teams to COCOMs [combatant commanders] for Stabilization and Reconstruction planning. We will also need new interagency coordinating mechanisms to guide policy development, implementation and oversight of multiple, simultaneous operations. The military will need to be prepared to interact with the new entities being promoted by the State Department, and build/exercise these interfaces to promote effective multi-agency operations to prevent or respond to crises. This will require new personnel programs, liaisons and exchange officers, doctrinal changes, and commitment from all sides.[77]

Nuance counts, heavy handed approaches should be avoided.

Heavy units are inappropriate for stability operations, as confined troops are focused more on the needs of the vehicle than on those of the community and the external operational situation. Even when dismounted, they still tend to think like tankers as opposed to infantry. But a "patrolling" operational culture is essential to successful security and peacekeeping operations. Battalion-sized operations tend not to produce significant results. The enemy simply goes to ground in their houses—"playing Nintendo and drinking tea," as one Marine put it.[78] Patience, persistence, and restraint must be coupled with resolve to effectively counter an insurgency, always remembering that it's the people and their support that are ultimately critical to success.[79]

Culture matters; in fact, it is crucial.

All interviews emphasized the absolutely essential need for accurate and relevant cultural intelligence when operating in urban environments with direct and recurring contact with the local population. Marine intelligence experts realize that what they call "cultural terrain" can be difficult to navigate.[80] One young Marine

[77] Randy Gangle, *Irregular Warfare II Conference Report*, Quantico, Va., Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, August 2005.

[78] Conlin email, Mar. 14, 2006.

[79] LtCol Sam Mundy, "No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy," *Proceedings*, April 2004. Colonel Mundy commanded 3/5 during OIF and served in Al Qadissiyah during the transition period.

[80] LtCol James L. Higgins, Major Michelle Trusso, and Maj Alfred B. Connable, "Marine Corps Intelligence: Charting a Course Across Cultural Terrain," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb. 2004, pp. 23-24.

squad leader said it best "Learning the language is just as important as live fire training. In some situations it's even more important."[81]

Create gaps, avoid surfaces.

The American default position was to attack the insurgents head on, essentially an "anti-insurgency" campaign vice a classical counterinsurgency model. The Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy teaches Marines to avoid strong points, what are called surfaces, and to seek gaps to exploit the enemy's rear or disrupt his overall system. This has equal application against insurgencies if one understands that the insurgents are a surface, and that the gap that is to be exploited and widened is the gap between the insurgent cadre and the general population. The goal is to widen this gap to the greatest degree possible, and avoid more destructive counterinsurgency operations. At least one young Marine Captain showed that he understood the difference between what he was doing in Iraq and what should have been done. He knows that they tried hard to do the right thing and that many instances of compassion and valor were exhibited, but overall:

> What we did little of, however, was execute the basic principles that must be applied to defeat an insurgency. We were never intimately familiar with the millions of people, languages, cultures, and terrain in any of the five provinces that we operated in for two weeks or longer. And, we did little to help indigenous security forces protect the populace from the insurgency.[82]

Communicate, communicate, communicate.

The Marines stressed both the importance of every Marine as an intelligence collector, but they also believed that a commander's themes need to be pushed down to every man in their area as well, in a sense, every Marine both a Rifleman, an intelligence collector, *and* a IO disseminator. In this sense, the Marines understood that actions would speak louder and with more credibility than just leaflets, broadcasts, and posters. Thus, every patrol and every council meeting was an opportunity to influence the population and ensure that the key themes of the American support to Iraq were consistently and frequently communicated. IO was not considered the domain of IO specialists, but a supporting arm with all Marines participating (with the exception of the public affairs community, which defends its independence and avoids any taint of propaganda or spin). But many Marines see Information Operations broadly defined and a key supporting arm or form of "fires" in any counterinsurgency. As one battalion commander put it,

[81] David Danelo, "The Linguistic Tipping Point," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Oct 2005, p. 30.
[82] Cuomo, "It's Time to Make ETTs the Main Effort."

> A command-wide approach taps into every man and asset you have, to include exploiting all foreign and US media. Politicians do it every day and very effectively. They learn to message and use sound bites. And their PAOs [public affairs officers] have no problems getting on message and focusing media on the "right story." We need to get past the notion that PAOs can never talk to Intel and PsyOps guys. They need to fuse.[83]

Such tactical fusion, however, will not resolve the larger problem of connecting the strategy to strategic IO themes and supporting operational and tactical actions. Regrettably, the processes that the U.S. government put into effect to manage the strategic end of the Informational component of the counterinsurgency never seemed to click.[84] Universally, operational commanders could not identify key strategic themes from Washington, or gain any additional support for operational/tactical information activities. Equally frustrating were the long production and product-approval cycles for IO products, which were completely out of synch with the rapid nature of information processing in modern societies and the need to rapidly counter gossip, misinformation, and outright distortions coming from the insurgents.

Policing over warfighting.

Many Marines emphasized the value of persistent patrolling or what they called the "cop on the beat."[85] The Marines, the 101st, and the UK conducted extensive foot patrolling throughout the urban centers, while other units tended to operate mobile patrols that limited their penetration into side streets and neighborhoods. The two approaches were compared to the cop on the beat as opposed to police patrolling in squad cars. Although the dismounted approach is in theory more dangerous, the constant interaction between the forces and the locals produced intelligence and foster a relationship that many believed contributed to a relatively lower incidence of violence. This is just one of many paradoxes and counterintuitive aspects of preventing or responding to counterinsurgency.[86]

[83] Conlin email, Mar. 14, 2006.

[84] Mattis interview, Mar. 11, 2006.

[85] This call for constant patrolling and saturation presence, as well as a distinct aspect of policing over warfighting was a predominant theme among Marines present at an Emerald Express conference, Quantico, Va., in Nov. 2003.

[86] Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, March-April 2006.

Conclusion

It is pretty clear that from the moment that Baghdad and Saddam's regime fell on April 9, the United States did not have the right instruments to exploit its military success. Winning the peace has proven to be much harder than winning the war. Instead of full dominance and strategic success, tactical success upon tactical success did not translate into the desired strategic end state in Iraq. The principal responsibility for the enormous challenge created in Iraq is more of a failing in both strategic culture and senior policy leadership than in the military doctrines of the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. The strategic culture of the United States, reflecting its unique founding, history, and geography, has shaped its cognitive outlook and its governmental machinery. Its Constitution, national history, and military ethic all extol the deference of military advice to civilian masters, often to fault.[87] As a nation, the United States tends to underestimate the importance of culture and language of other peoples, overemphasizing universal values and the role of technology as a problem solver.[88] The messy intangibles of cultural context and local politics are too rarely appreciated. Likewise, its impatience and optimism tend to induce a lack of stamina, which is the antithesis of the kind of institutional or national endurance required to deal with protracted conflicts. A nation of "drive-thru" windows and electronic banking expects fast results, not extended commitment and protracted consequences.

Just as important, the Cold War created an extraordinary emphasis on military muscle at the expense of other instruments of national power. This has badly misshaped the total capacity of the U.S. government in other areas, producing can be called the One-Armed Cyclops syndrome.[89] This caricature captures the United States' predisposition to look at problems through a single military lens and capable of responding solely with its single military arm. Its diplomatic, assistance and informational tools are anemic by comparison. Clearly, this lack of governmental capacity has left the military holding a larger and longer role than it was designed for, or culturally disposed to execute.[90]

---

[87] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, *Soldiers: Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime,* New York: Free Press, 2004.

[88] On American strategic culture see Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. See also his monograph, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy, Can the American Way of War Adapt," Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006.

[89] Frank G. Hoffman, "Transforming The One-Armed Cyclops," paper delivered at the U.S. Army Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Apr. 13, 2004.

[90] Although there is clearly a need for military governance in immediate postconflict situations and an historical argument regarding previously successful American examples of military government. See Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters,* Autumn 2003.

With respect to upper level policy guidance and direction, the historical record makes it pretty clear that military authorities would have to work under difficult conditions. Civilian leaders would not devote sufficient attention or resources to the post-invasion conditions inside Iraq. Expectations of conditions on the ground were widely off the mark, and the role of Iraqi exiles unrealistically promoted. Short-term decisions, like disbanding the Iraqi military, ended up producing greater longer term consequences. Sufficient resources, in terms of either military or non-military agencies, would not be assigned to the resulting post-Saddam vacuum created in 2003. Even appointed proconsuls would find their requests for additional manpower ignored.[91] Funding needs to reconstruct a postwar government and economy were low balled. Unilateral policy actions and poor diplomacy would ensure that the United States would be in Iraq without sufficient aid from a large coalition or the generous support of international relief organizations. Decisions made in Washington and in Baghdad on behalf of Washington, continually exacerbated the situation. In particular, the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the failure to ameliorate the impact this would have on the security situation, and the families of these soldiers was never properly gauged. A convoluted and ad hoc organization, understaffed with inexperienced officials, tried to sort some order out of this chaos, while ensconced within a cocoon known as the Green Zone.[92]

This left the U.S. military and its willing coalition partners with a difficult uphill challenge. A window of opportunity was missed as the proverbial car sped by on wobbly wheels with thin tread. The initial transition period was handled very well by the military, and the U.S. Marines' response highlighted the mental agility of its leaders and the organizational adaptability of its expeditionary and small-wars legacy. But it also revealed shortcomings in specific capabilities or organizational capacities uniquely relevant to protracted complex counterinsurgencies. Shortfalls in cultural intelligence, language capacity, and human intelligence were found. New planning skills for meshing non-kinetic tools, civil affairs and information operations into more traditional security operations were needed. The depth or capacity of civil affairs units and staff expertise in key areas were found wanting, and rectified. An institutional need for formal training and preparation of units to train and advise foreign military forces was eventually "relearned."

These shortfalls have been identified and are being resolved with appropriate doctrinal, organizational, educational, and materiel changes.[93] These changes are being

[91] L. Paul Bremer, *My Year in Baghdad*, New York: Random House, 2005.

[92] Gregory Packer, *Assassin's Gate: American in Iraq*, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005.

[93] Gen. Mike W. Hagee, USMC, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Mar. 9, 2006.

shared with sister Services like the U.S. Army, and incorporate insights from coalition partners, including the Australian and British Army. The creativity and improvisation inbred into expeditionary forces by their need to constantly adapt was clearly evident in 2003, and is now being institutionally demonstrated as the Marines created more robust or more refined units and organizations to ensure that future generations can adapt even faster to the unique demands of postconflict situations and complex contingencies in which military forces must integrate seamlessly with other partners. Without flogging my metaphor too much, the next generation of Marines should be able to change the tire before the car even starts gaining any momentum.

It might be true that the Marines did not have a formal doctrine for what was to follow their impressive drive towards Baghdad. But as General Mattis has remarked, "Doctrine is the last refuge of the unimaginative." More than formal doctrine, military leaders need to be broadly educated and prepared to adapt their operational modes, planning processes and even their organizations on the fly to meet the unique circumstances they find on the ground. Each contingency must be evaluated on its own cultural context, informed by history and political guidance. The enduring need to prepare Marines by teaching them "how to think" rather than "what to think" has always been a hallmark of its educational institutions. As a Marine General observed after his role in Iraq:

> Some have said we have no doctrine for what we did in Phase IV, but I disagree. I know it is not technically doctrine, but I suggest our *Small Wars Manual* for a starter, not to mention our documented successes learned for us in Vietnam by some very brave men. In reality, however, we do have a doctrine and a warfighting philosophy that opens the mind to problem-solving and avoids the set piece [solution]. What we do have, I can assure you, are sufficient leaders at every level who run through the loop very fast—and act without hesitation. These are individuals who will employ a 2,000 pound JDAM or pass out water to anti-coalition protesters, situation depending.[94]

There probably exists a perfect world somewhere where a very comprehensive and well resourced political/military plan has been carefully developed and painstakingly coordinated for implementation in a bloody crisis. The historical cupboard is a bit bare, however. The record is that most conflicts are "come as you are" events and armed forces need to be prepared to maintain order and establish conditions for a better peace. Hopefully, history will be exploited in the current case and the proper lessons drawn. The price of rapid and sudden military success need not always rely upon completely *ad hoc* solutions with tools ill suited for the purpose. Nor should operations be conducted in such a way that they engender or actively motivate a

[94] John Kelly, "From Tikrit to Babylon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2004, p. 24.

resistance to our own policy aims. The U.S. military should consult with its allies and study its own history to better prepare for transition operations using predominantly military forces.[95]

Changing tires is a messy necessity of modern life, but it doesn't have to be done on a moving car—while being shot at. Nor does it have to be done with one arm (or agency). This will require additional educational, doctrinal and some force structure changes inside the American national security community. Just as important, it will require additional investment in non-military tools to ensure that tomorrow's Cyclops has a more holistic "lens" and is fully armed with all elements of national power.

[95] Conlin interview, email to the author, Mar. 14, 2006.

Appendix A. Command, Control and Communications

American Joint and Service doctrine advises the military that its hierarchal structure and strict chain of command is seldom achieved in situations short of war.[96] Unity of effort is less efficient than formal unity of command within a complex coalition, but it is more likely to be politically acceptable or achieved. The military expects a rigid unity of command and formal and fixed command relationships established for combat operations, and would prefer to maintain it throughout all phases of any operation. Many observers cited the problem of unity of command, or a lack thereof, as a persistent issue in debriefs. A strong preference was annunciated for a single commander or civil administrator in each region.[97] Maintaining security and providing for all the political and nonmilitary aspects of a postconflict stability situation requires tradeoffs that British experience in Malaya and Kenya suggest operations are intertwined. Thus, the individual responsible for security must also control and coordinate all other aspects of stability operations in his area.

In the case of "postconflict" Iraq, there were unity of command and command relationships problems on both the military and civilian sides of the issue. On the military side, some operations run by Special Operations Forces or other government agencies were not synchronized with conventional force operations. On the civilian side, unity of command challenges were exacerbated by the presence of governmental and civilian organizations that do not place the same importance on unity of command as the military community. Further confusing the issue was the fact that the two parallel civilian and military chains of command were not evenly aligned or necessarily interoperable. There were no civilian counterparts at battalion and company level, where the real work with the Iraqi people must be done. This situation has already had a number of adverse effects. For example, well-intentioned programs designed and implemented by the civilian chain-of-command to gain the support of the local Iraqi population have, on occasion, been poorly planned, coordinated, and executed. At least one such program ended in anti-U.S. demonstrations and even riots, which had to be quelled by the military.

One of the biggest issues in command and control during such missions is the relationship between the military and civilian instruments. This was not an issue during the combat phase of the operation, but it is now universally understood that

[96] However, the *Small Wars Manual* warns its reader that irregular missions are "conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility, and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions." Section 1-1, p. 6.

[97] Observations of the author from participation in a Marine sponsored conference on this topic in Nov. 2003 at Quantico, VA.

the lack of planning and the lack of inputs from non-military agencies was a critical shortfall. The Marines made do during the initial transition phase, and had to interact with the CPA when they returned in 2004. Responsibilities between the military and civilian sphere was not clearly delineated or understood. For example, which organization will have the lead in matters related to intelligence gathering and the training of the Iraqi security forces? In the best cases, CPA-sponsored teams worked well with the military by introducing them to town leaders and facilitating their entry into a city. But the CPA was described as understaffed, prone to make hasty decisions, and lacking the ability to coordinate. There were a number of cases where CPA policies acted to undercut military authority and credibility at the city level and negated efforts to improve the overall security and stability situation. For example, CPA policies with a direct impact on military operations were often discussed with the Iraqis and implemented without any coordination with the military leadership. These policy decisions were made and agreed to between the CPA and Iraqis and transmitted through Iraqi channels, sometimes catching the U.S. military chain of command unaware. On rare occasions the Iraqis knew what was going to happen before the military did. The military must have a seat at the table at the local level (the battalion) before the CPA issues orders or initiates projects.

Personnel at the operational level of command need to have the same picture on the ground as the tactical commanders, rarely achieved in Iraq. This has led to some misconceptions about conditions and trends on the ground, and a great deal of acrimony. One partial solution to the coordination challenge may be the establishment of a common Iraqi Operations Internet System with access granted to the U.S. military, selected allies, the CPA, and others.

Other forms and greater capacity for beyond-line-of-sight communications equipment is needed to support Coalition operations during SASO, as well as to provide additional resources for convoys and patrolling activity.

Aside from the bifurcated command lash ups and the doctrine/communications gap between civil and military organizations, the Marine Corps felt that their maneuver warfare philosophy and decentralized command precepts paid off well when the Marines were ultimately distributed to their various cities and towns. The majority of the battalion and company commanders were very comfortable in noncontiguous formations and in nontraditional command arrangement that gave them lots of freedom to improvise and devise unique solutions.[98]

[98] See Kelly articles and Col Mundy's email to the author, Mar. 30, 2006.

Appendix B. Interagency Coordination

The major challenge in interagency coordination was the thin manpower levels of the U.S. interagency community; their archaic personnel systems, which did not allow for rapid mobilization of necessary expertise to theater; and the profound dearth of interagency doctrine and coordinating mechanisms. These shortfalls are well known to the U.S. national security community and have been the subject of numerous studies and proposals. Ongoing efforts by the U.S. government have been taken at the Department of State, which have the full support of both the DoD and the Marines.[99]

The Marines found coordination the American interagency frustrating. Relations with the CPA were difficult; both the CPA's timing and personnel were seen as lacking. Many in the military were under the impression that once an area was seized civilian authorities would come in and take over. Some of this reflects unreasonable expectations or a delusion about the veneer of planning and deployable manpower available to the non-military agencies of the American government. The CPA had difficulty forming a staff and deploying its personnel, so the expected support did not arrive in a timely manner, and there should have been some awareness of the existing capability gaps in the U.S. portfolio of national instruments. When CPA personnel did arrive, they were not the experts in disaster response, governance, and banking and infrastructure that were urgently needed to make an immediate difference. Thus, military units were routinely distracted from security missions to perform duties they thought would be the responsibility of the CPA.

The Marines shrugged and did what they had to do, with mixed results. The establishment of a Governing Council, the selection of ministers for each ministry, the setting up of Town and Provincial Councils by the military commanders in the regions, and the rapid contracting for minor reconstruction activities with Iraqis was all done in a reasonable and expedient manner according to most Marine planners. Yet too much of the planning was ad hoc and shallowly developed. At times this led to considerable contentiousness because of the lack of effective coordination and communications between the distant CPA in Baghdad and the military units who were face to face with the facts on the ground.[100]

---

[99] Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,* Phase 2 Report, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005; Brent Scowcroft and Sandy Berger, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Postconflict Capabilities*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005. For a summary of U.S. government initiatives, see Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2005.

[100] Conlin, "What Do You Do for an Encore?" and Mattis interview, Mar. 11, 2006.

The most common conclusion in OIF After-Action Reviews, which addressed interagency issues, were failures of planning and preparation. The most common complaint was what is termed stovepipe planning—planning done within each of the interagency organizations' chain of command and not a part of a larger, integrated effort. The most common recommendation was the need to develop better integrated strategic planning processes and doctrine. This impression is echoed throughout all the postconflict recommendations of various U.S. think tanks, and was completely predictable.

There is no template for postconflict recovery planning at the U.S. government level, although there is an extensive body of expertise and literature in Washington. Pieces of a possible blueprint exist from the accumulating experiences, but no manual exists for the deliberate process of moving intent or policy goals to effective operations. A better U.S. government response to postconflict requirements would require an institutionalized, integrated strategic planning process that includes representatives from relevant government agencies (and possibly, international organizations and NGOs). Structural changes to establish that process institutionally within the American government have begun to be addressed, at the tactical, operational and strategic level. However, mixed success has been achieved due to the nature of the U.S. legislative process and the cultural proclivities or habits of the national security machinery in America.

The collective postconflict intervention experiences, in particular Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrate their level of complexity. These events require the most effective team effort from all departments across the entire U.S. government. While a considerable amount of interagency planning occurred for Iraq, past "lessons learned" pointed out in evaluations of postconflict responses that too much has been "stovepipe" in the past and that agencies too frequently react reflexively with their existing pat responses and fail to develop and employ the requisite mix and depth of capabilities. The concept of "integrated strategic planning" is just beginning to be seriously explored as it applies to postconflict recovery challenges, and a serious effort to produce joint and national doctrine is still studiously being avoided.[101]

Given that a systematic integrated strategic planning process was not established, the continuity of planning efforts on the civilian side during the transition from pre-conflict to on-ground efforts is probably best characterized as each agency taking forward the plans it had developed to the field through the staff they deployed to ORHA. The coordination sessions that were held, then, became good information-

[101] The exception being a bilateral effort by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines to produce a common counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006.

sharing sessions, including questions-and-answers among team members. But a budget process that allocated resources from a centrally coordinated authority did not accompany this. ORHA's budget and mandate was not clearly established at the beginning. This meant that agencies which had funding resources to draw on pending the passage of the supplemental budget, like U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), could contribute to the discussions with reasonable certainty on in-country programs they anticipated implementing.

The ability to employ either Iraqi or American funding to jump start the local economy or to support the commander's civil affairs projects was a very frustrating challenge. Commanders enjoyed some early latitude with cash discovered during raids or in abandoned Iraqi government facilities. Such resources were limited and a more formal program was quickly put together, which received high marks. The Commander's Emergency Response Program funds were greatly appreciated by local commanders to target local reconstruction efforts. However, once the CPA was up and running, monies were requested and often allocated but not regularly spent due to numerous bureaucratic hoops and frequent interference from Baghdad.[102]

Operational commanders and their battle staffs were not very familiar with the lacunae of budget projects, managing funding for construction efforts, or supervising foreign entities hired to work on civil affairs projects. Many military officers expressed frustration at the obvious need for central guidance and decentralized execution of reconstruction funding based on local assessments of critical areas that needed to be addressed. The "dinar grenade" was one of their most potent weapons, but restrictive rules of engagement seemed to constrain Marines from doing what locally was seen as very necessary.[103] The slow processing and allocation of limited resources was a source of friction.[104] There was also frustration, even between military officers, at the different pace, processes and language used between the CPA and the military staffs in Iraq.[105] All in all, the Marines would agree with the former Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction at the U.S. State Department, Ambassador Carlos Pascaul,

[102] Mattis interview, Mar. 11, 2006.

[103] A strong consensus among Marine unit leaders on this point was made at the Emerald Express conference at Quantico conducted by the Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Nov. 2003.

[104] A point made by numerous officers at the Emerald Express Conference. This event was one of a series run by the Wargaming Division over a long period to capture best practices and insights.

[105] Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," *Parameters*, Winter 2005-06.

who bluntly put it, "We can no longer afford to do this the way it has been done in the past."[106]

This frustration has induced Marine concept writers and analysts to work closely with Joint Forces Command and the U.S. State Department to enhance all aspects of the interagency planning process, and improvements to contingency funding and surge personnel capabilities for agencies outside the Pentagon. In a world calling for a broader range of multi-dimensional tools, one demanding the tightly integrated application of all instruments of national power, effective interagency coordination and robust execution is emerging as the primary path to success.[107]

[106] Carlos Pascaul, speech at the Marine Corps Irregular Warfare II Conference, Quantico, VA, July 12, 2005.

[107] Matthew Bogdanos, "Interagency Operations, The Marine Specialty of This Century," *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2006.

Appendix C. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

While there were ISR shortfalls throughout OIF, Marine intelligence showed its ability to improvise and adapt as well as the rest of the MAGTF. All in all, intelligence was an enabler and the Marine's overall success reflected a decade of dedicated progress in the Marine intelligence community.[108] Intelligence, like the other supporting "tools," also had to make the rapid transition from conventional operations against a known enemy.

The importance of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) emerged as a key issue. IPB is much more difficult in complex urban environments given the likelihood of unconventional, highly adaptive, and asymmetrical foes operating amongst a population of noncombatants. Moreover, "cultural intelligence" is a critical aspect of IPB in this environment. A particular challenge was tactical units increasingly conducting tasks (e.g., IPB and information management) normally associated with higher headquarters with much larger staffs. The Marine intelligence community has developed procedures to alter the IPB process to address these needs. Across the force there was agreement about the lack of intelligence dissemination down to the brigade, battalion, and company echelons. The best sources of intelligence were the spot reports and other information obtained by maneuver units and small teams that were then analyzed by higher headquarters. Intelligence collected and processed at higher levels and sent down was often irrelevant by the time it reached the tactical units.[109] The unconventional tactics of the Saddam Fedeyeen and other Iraqi forces such as shedding their uniforms for civilian clothes, using civilian vehicles to move on and attack US forces, and using schools and hospitals to stage munitions and to house headquarters presented formidable challenges. By adopting these tactics, the Iraqis negated much of the U.S. high-tech advantage in ISR: ISR sensors and automated intelligence systems built for and optimized to fight conventional enemy formations. This may explain why so many interviewees initially commented on the lack of intelligence from higher headquarters, and on the fact that tactical units provided the majority of the intelligence which helped fill the information gaps left by an ISR system sub-optimized for the nature of the threat confronted.

A central finding was that ISR assets should be pushed down to the lowest possible level. There seemed to be a direct correlation between how much and how far down assets were pushed and how capable a particular tactical force viewed itself. Task

[108] U.S. Marine Corps, *Summary Report of USMC Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Quantico, VA: Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team, undated (2004).

[109] See Michael S. Groen, "Blue Diamond Intelligence, Division Level Intelligence Operations During OIF," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb 2004, pp. 22-25, and Toolan interview.

Force Tarawa was a case in point. It was organized as an MEB that, upon arrival in theater, had its aviation element incorporated into 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, but retained all other forces and staff. Tarawa had a number of ISR capabilities directly under its control that would normally only be found at the MEF level. These assets provided it with a far greater ISR capability than that enjoyed by the 1st Marine Division. The Tarawa Marines seemed satisfied with their ability to "see" and fight their battlespace, while those at the Division commented on their lack of intelligence from other than their own units. Tarawa was a model of a self-contained, task-organized force with its own robust ISR capabilities. This type of organization is more capable and suitable for the conduct of urban operations, as well as independent operations.

Human Intelligence

Due to the degradation of other intelligence collection assets in an urban environment, human intelligence (HUMINT) was the primary collection source during OIF urban operations. HUMINT information was most useful when reporting went directly to the tactical commander. Units that pushed HETs down to the battalion, company, and in some cases platoon levels were generally pleased with the capability and its contributions to their intelligence picture and operations. Particularly valuable HUMINT capabilities at those levels were translators and personnel trained to extract information. Generally, tactical combat units were most effective when they had HETs attached. In cases where a HET was simply operating in a unit's zone, and their reporting went straight to a higher headquarters, its usefulness to the unit was significantly diminished. Perishable intelligence was often of little use by the time it was analyzed and sent back down the chain of command. Yet, the quantity of HET assets was a universal complaint.

A key issue that emerged was whether an increase in tactical level HUMINT capability is a force structure issue (additional HETs) or a training issue. During urban operations, and especially during security and humanitarian missions, ground forces are often in daily contact with large numbers of noncombatants. These contacts could be a source of valuable HUMINT if the troops were provided with focused "skills" training. The lack of qualified Arabic linguists/interpreters was cited as the number one shortfall during OIF.[110]

Veterans stated that 90 percent of their information and understanding of the local populace/environment came from daily unit patrolling activity. This was referred to as "hugging tactics"; squad size elements would patrol the city and interact with the

[110] Groen, "Blue Diamond Intelligence," p. 23.

inhabitants, similar to that of a police officer assigned to a city beat. The squads were given the commander's critical intelligence requirements and were organized and dispatched to visit, observe and report on as much as possible. Additionally, the squads were to interact with the locals and develop relationships. Thus hugging tactics had the reciprocal effect of presenting the local inhabitants the opportunity to know and understand U.S. forces. Although the "hugging tactics" of patrols were effective, there was the difficulty of efficiently debriefing the patrols and gathering information. It normally took over twelve hours before patrol information was available at the battalion level. Additionally, participants expressed the need for a database to store and manage the large amount of information acquired over time. The many pieces put together over time can become unmanageable and inherently difficult to fuse.

Intelligence Systems

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). There was satisfaction with the capabilities and usefulness of UAVs during combat operations, especially when ground forces had control of or access to the feed of UAVs. Participants believed there is a need for more UAVs at the tactical level and a "layering" of UAVs from the lowest unit level to higher commands (e.g. MEF/corps - Predator, division/regiment/brigade - Pioneer, battalion/company - Dragon Eye). The overall message was that responsiveness to the immediate needs of the forces on the ground is of paramount importance. Participants were dissatisfied with the insufficient number of UAVs, which they felt were controlled at too high a level to be responsive to the tactical commander. UAV operations were considered successful for the MEF (and possibly Corps) level of command, but were less successful at the regiment/brigade and battalion levels. Sharing relevant information and intelligence gleaned by UAVs between units, both vertically between higher and lower levels and horizontally between adjacent units was problematic. Most felt this was more a problem of technical (communications) limitations than reluctance by a controlling unit to share UAV reporting.

Maps. Many complained of insufficient quantities or types of maps, particularly of the urban areas. City maps with a scale of 1:12,500 printed in the local language to help civilians pinpoint buildings or areas of activity were preferred. Most felt that the lack of maps at the tactical level was more a reproduction, printing, and distribution problem than a lack of mapping data. A capability to reproduce existing hard copy and digital topographic products, and produce them in sufficient quantities is needed at the division level. Many units preferred image-based maps that often were more recent and gave a more accurate representation of the battlespace in terms of buildings and other man-made structures. Tactical units found a robust CD-based set of maps of the entire theater useful. Despite limitations on local reproduction/printing capabilities, at a minimum unit commanders (particularly those

in vehicles equipped with C2PC[111] or other C2 systems) could pull up the digital map or image of almost any area in which they operated. Providing the same maps to squad and team leaders as well as individual observers for artillery, mortars and aviation is still a challenge. Many leaders praised the availability of Falcon View at the battalion level, an intelligence/visualization system that provides the ability to conduct a virtual terrain fly-through in a terrain database prior to the movement of units.

Intelligence Organization. In OIF I, the Marines realized that they were encumbered during transition operations with a sizable shortfall in intelligence capability at the battalion level and below, while they were over-invested in capital intensive collection systems supporting operational level planning headquarters. In a more static and protracted conflict for OIF II, this would not do. If tactical units could not benefit from an intelligence architecture that was principally designed to serve operational-level commanders in high tempo maneuver operations, it would have to be adapted to suit the nature of SASO/counterinsurgency operations.[112]

The solution was the creation of a new concept and organizational. The concept was to "push intelligence horsepower where it was needed most to ensure a bias for tactical action." The organizational component was known as the tactical fusion center (TFC). Tactical support to the ground combat element became the intelligence main effort, and the intelligence support assets were focused to provide the bulk of its horsepower to—and at—the tactical level. This would create a fused and very granular operational picture produced from the "ground up," reflecting a detailed mosaic created and held by tactical units on the battlefield. By contrast, OIF I intelligence had imposed a "top-down" picture of the battlefield that was often at odds with the tactical commanders' experience on the ground.

The basic premise underlying the concept was removing the echelons of command and distance between the intelligence analysts and the commanders on the ground to provide intelligence appropriate to drive tactical operations. Marine intelligence specialists believe that a virtual or actual fusion center where all intelligence disciplines are integrated into one comprehensive picture is the mark of a comprehensive intelligence support program. The TFC was to contain the supporting capabilities to enable targeting, intelligence collections, topographic support, imagery, and patrol reports. The Marines would have liked to create one TFC for each regimental area, with an operational level fusion center supporting the MEF or Division command post. But lacking both the analysts and the requisite information systems, the Marines

[111] Command & Control PC (C2PC) is a Windows-based software application designed to facilitate military command and control functions.

[112] Michael S. Groen, "The Tactical Fusion Center," *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2005.

settled for a single TFC that would be collocated with the Marine Division's operational center.

As its appellation suggests, the new TFC was designed to be responsive first to tactical ground units and second to the other consumers. At the core of this fusion center were battlespace support teams (BSTs), each responsible for a single regiment. Overseeing these BSTs was a broader "cross boundary team" (CBT). A trends and tactics team provided zone-wide trend analysis, statistical analysis, and operational-level assessments. The CBT contained the senior analysts and were the keepers of the "intellectual content" of the TFC. Functional skills including Signals intelligence, HUMINT, geospatial and imagery intelligence were all positioned to best support the BSTs and the CBT. As defined by the Division Intelligence Officer, the desired effect was for continuous shared situational awareness between the regimental S-2 and the BST, so much so that the BST would become an unofficial extension of the Regimental intelligence shop. The BSTs provided immediate access to targeting intelligence, raid support, network diagramming, systems support, mapping products, and theater intelligence collections down to lower levels as needed. The BSTs did "the blocking and tackling against systems and bureaucracy so that tactical consumers could just run with the ball." The TFC represented a "reach forward" capability for bottom-up information that was timely and relevant which is the anti-thesis of the "reach back" capability that Marine intelligence has been oriented on acquiring from the rear. Such top-down information was not as relevant or timely because it lacked local micro-context.

The results were considered excellent. The TFC organization brought substantial payoffs in access to all-source intelligence feeds, rapid turnaround of targeting packages, raid folders, current imagery, and access to collections systems. The real difference was in mindset, advocacy, and prioritization. With the BSTs fully plugged in to the supporting theater architecture, and with a good picture of the tactical situation, they fully supported the tactical fight. Regimental and battalion S-2s highly praised the new tactical focus. Over time, even higher headquarters eventually showed more interest in the TFC's operational assessments because of their tactical relevance and accuracy. A bottom-up intelligence picture developed by Marine enlisted intelligence specialists on the scene proved more relevant than top-down assessments produced by distant functional experts. As one Marine intelligence expert put it:

Collocating the TFC with the division headquarters for this fight was a significant move in the right direction, but it may not have gone far enough. The Marine Corps has work to do to evaluate pushing this concept even further. In OIF I we learned that those tactical consumers farthest from a supporting centralized intelligence center require the greatest resolution on the battlefield. In OIF II we learned that the less

"conventional" the conflict, the further forward we must push our intelligence capabilities.[113]

Because of the time-sensitive nature of most tactical intelligence in a counterinsurgency, the Marines have concluded that their "intelligence cycle" should take place at company level and below. That means that each company should have an intelligence cell consisting of two or more noncommissioned officers, and that each Battalion be augmented with an intelligence section of two officers and nine enlisted personnel. This will reverse the irony of intelligence in Iraq, where "those tactical commanders who require the highest resolution of the battlefield (and have the least time) are those least able to influence a very complex and highly centralized intelligence architecture."[114] The Marine Corps answer to this challenge is called Actionable Intelligence, an emerging concept with great potential in tomorrow's complex contingencies.[115]

[113] Groen, "The Tactical Fusion Center," p. 62.

[114] Groen, "Blue Diamond Intelligence," p. 23.

[115] Thomas O'Leary and Dwight Lyons, *Actionable Intelligence Concept*, Quantico, VA: Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, 2005. Paul A. Shelton, "Leveraging Actionable Intelligence," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec. 2005.

Appendix D. Urban Operations

Upon its inception, the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory began to prepare for urban warfare through rigorous historical study, coordination with traditional allies like the British, and concept development and experimentation.[116] The goal was to discover improved methods to fight, survive and win in complex urban terrain via concept driven experimentation.[117] This effort culminated in a series of experiments in the Marine's noted Warrior series in the late 1990s, of which Urban Warrior in 1999 was the apex of interest in this topic.[118] Over time new tactics, techniques, and procedures were developed, and a thorough training package known as the Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) program was designed. This program focused on intense preparation of individuals and training over technological fixes. Many battalions opted to request and undertake this training package as part of their formal pre-deployment training in the early days of the twenty-first century, although the program was not institutionalized until OIF loomed. The development of the BUST package allowed the Marine Corps to develop a combined-arms team approach to urban combat that is probably the most thorough tactical preparation in the world. The Marine Corps investment and intensive interest in urban warfare was clearly vindicated by the fighting during OIF.[119]

As a result of lessons drawn from the Urban Warrior program, the Marine Corps established Project Metropolis in 1999. The project's principal goal was to develop a "base line" training package aimed at increasing individual and unit proficiency in urban operations. The project's hypothesis was that a properly trained and equipped MAGTF could succeed in urban combat and sustain acceptable casualties. Acceptable casualties were estimated to be roughly 15 percent of the total fighting force, which was only half the historical casualty rate for city combat. The development of this package was intended for a general-purpose force employing combined-arms—a hallmark of the Marine Corps force design and warfighting philosophy.

---

[116] On the Urban Warrior Experiment see Randolph A. Gangle, "The Foundation for Urban Warrior," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Jul 1998, pp. 52-54; Gary Anderson, "Project Metropolis: Exploiting the lessons of URBAN WARRIOR," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sept. 2000, p. 54.

[117] To drive this process, the Marine Combat Development Command issued Paul K. Van Riper, *A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain,* Quantico, VA, 25 July 1997.

[118] Thomas X. Hammes, "Time to get serious about urban warfare training," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Apr. 1999; Daryl G Press, "Urban Warfare: Options, Problems, and the Future," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Apr. 1999.

[119] For the most detailed discussion of Marine efforts to enhance operational skills in the urban environment see Lieutenant Colonel John Simeoni, "US Marine Urban Combined-arms Operations in Iraq: Some Observations," *Australian Army Journal*, Autumn 2005.

Over six years, Project Metropolis developed a BUST syllabus designed to provide Marine infantry and supporting forces with well honed urban combat skills. The range of formations and tactics were expanded over time, as Marines grappled with the unique circumstances of dense urban complexes and structures. New tactics included platoons employing heavy weapons and snipers, as well as the full skill set of a reinforced battalion landing teams with its organic engineering and armor assets.[120] This final step in the development of the BUST program was the product of an experiment requiring the full integration of combined arms force conducted during the summer of 2002. MCWL personnel ran an experiment aimed at testing battalion-landing teams in a three-block war scenario to evaluate the transition from warfighting (block 3) to what was called "peace enforcement" tasks (block 2) in an intense operational environment. In the 2002 experiment, the Marines used a former American Air Force facility, the George Air Base in Victorville, California because of its 400 vacant buildings. This type of building complex is probably the minimum requirement for any realistic battalion-level activity in urban warfare. This experiment showed that the transition from block 3 to block 2 modes is a true test of any military organization's adaptability. Being able to deal with humanitarian issues while simultaneously fighting a highly trained enemy was recognized as a valuable capability.

While not officially embraced across all Marine Corps commands, MCWL's BUST package was still highly regarded by commanders as a valuable initiative due to global demographics and the frequency in which Marines found themselves deployed to urban hot spots. MCWL offered professional trainers, resources (including small caliber non-lethal training ammunition) and a setting with a degree of realism not found anywhere else in the infantry training program. The Project Metropolis team developed a prototype training package whose value was soon understood within the Marine Corps, and which was completely incorporated into pre-OIF training as one of the most critical components of the pre-war training package.

There were several complicating factors experienced by Marine forces operating in Iraq that are worth noting. A unique feature of the fighting throughout Iraqi urban areas was the constant presence of civilians. Regardless of the intensity of a battle and the power and range of the weapons being employed, most Iraqi residents remained at or near their homes. Often they came out of hiding to observe fighting. The presence of military forces and weapons on the streets was not foreign to many Iraqis as it might have been to Americans, although some Marines have practiced their urban skills in U.S. cities as a way of improving their true awareness of the unique aspects of the modern urban metropolis. Marines interviewed noted that the

[120] Randolph A. Gangle, "Training for urban operations in the 21st century," *Marine Corps Gazette*; July 2001.

persistent presence of civilians in a warfighting zone is an operational aspect that needs to be incorporated into future urban combat training. In addition, the deliberate or accidental admixture of Iraqi civilians with Iraqi combatants created complications. This made target identification and weapon employment more time consuming and discriminating. The Marines were prepared for that, but they were not prepared to have to conduct warfighting tasks and humanitarian activities at the same time. The three-block war was not a sequential challenge as originally depicted, it was a simultaneous problem, one for which the forces were neither configured nor trained to do. The appearance of civilians during and at the immediate end of a violent close quarter engagement continually amazed many Marines.

Despite the major urban fights of Baghdad, Fallujah and Najaf, many OIF participants stressed that urban operations are essentially decentralized combats requiring superb small unit skills. In essence, urban operations are "a corporal and sergeant's fight." Although they acknowledged the role of higher headquarters and formations in shaping and supporting the urban fight, the actual conduct of operations within the urban landscape generally is performed at the squad and platoon level. This was the focus of the BUST effort, which many applauded as both superb training and something that saved many casualties over the course of OIF evolutions. Even when large regimental sized combat teams were employed inside Iraqi towns, the complex nature of the terrain—the blocks, buildings and walls—compartmented the environment into small isolated cells. Communications were often blocked or compromised, hindering traditional C2 techniques. Communications became more direct and personal. Thus, platoons, squads, and even teams often found themselves operating in relative isolation from higher or adjacent formations. In this regard, recent improvements to tactical communications and situational awareness such as the Personal Role Radio were seen a positive developments. Additional improvements to improve urban operations were seen as needed, and combat identification, intelligence, fire support, specialized equipment, weapons, etc. were noted as necessary developments. These developments were seen just as important regardless of which block of the three-block war the platoon or squad might fight its self operating within.

About the Author

Mr. Hoffman is a retired Marine infantry officer and a graduate of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, George Mason University, and the U.S. Naval War College. He previously served as an analyst in the Pentagon and on the Armed Forces' 1994–95 Roles and Missions Commission and as a staff member on the U.S. Commission on National Security (the Hart-Rudman Commission). He is a Senior Fellow of the FPRI and a Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in Quantico, Va.

Selected Bibliography

Belanger, Tyson, "The Cooperative Will of War," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan 2006.

Bickel, Keith B., *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940*, Westview Press, 2001.

Bogdanos, Matthew, "Interagency Operations, The Marine Specialty of This Century," *Marine Corps Gazette,* March 2006.

Boot, Max, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power,* Perseus Books, 2002.

Buhl, Willard A., "Strategic Small Unit Leaders," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan 2006.

Callwell, C.E., *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice,* University of Nebraska Press, 1996.

Cassidy, Robert M., "Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly," *Military Review*, Sept./Oct. 2002.

Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War,* Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton University Press, 1989.

Clutterbuck, Richard L., *The Long Long War: Counter-Insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam,* Praeger, 1966.

Coates, John, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948*-1954, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992.

Connally, Thomas and Lance McDaniel, "Leaving the Tubes at Home," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Oct 2005.

Cohen, Eliot, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, March-April 2006.

Cohen, Eliot, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," *International Security*, Fall 1984.

_____ *Supreme Command*, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime,* New York: Free Press, 2004.

Conlin, Christopher, "What Do You Do for an Encore?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sept. 2004.

Collins, John M., *America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future,* Brassey's, 1991.

Cordesman, Anthony H., Strategic Lessons from Iraq, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002.

Cuomo, Scott, ""It's Time to Make ETTs the Main Effort," *Marine Corps Gazette,* June 2006.

Danelo, David, "The Linguistic Tipping Point," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Oct 2005.

Fallows, James, "Why Iraq Has No Army," *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec. 2005.

Gangle, Randolph A., "Training for Urban Operations in the 21st Century," *Marine Corps Gazette*; July 2001, pp.26-28.

_____ "The Foundation for Urban Warrior," *Marine Corps Gazette,* July 1998.

_____ *Irregular Warfare II Conference Report*, Quantico, VA, Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, August 2005.

Goodale, G Jason and Jon Webre, "The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette,* April 2005.

Groen, Michael S., "Blue Diamond Intelligence, Division Level Intelligence Operations During OIF," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb 2004.

_____ "The Tactical Fusion Center," *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2005.

Gwynn, Sir Charles, *Imperial Policing,* London*:* MacMillan and Co, 1934.

Hammes, T. X., *The Sling and Stone*, Regency, 2004.

Harmon, Christopher, C., *Terrorism Today*, Frank Cass, 2000.

Hennessy, Michael A., *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972,* Praeger, 1997.

Hirsch, John and Oakley, Robert, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, United States Institute of Peace, 1995.

Higgins, James L., Michelle Trusso, and Alfred B. Connable, "Marine Corps Intelligence: Charting a Course Across Cultural Terrain," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Feb. 2004.

Hoffman, Bruce, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, 1998.

_____. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,* RAND, June 2004.

Hoffman, Frank G., "Transforming The One-Armed Cyclops," paper delivered at the U.S. Army Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 13, 2004.

Horne, Alistair, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, New York: Viking, 1978.

Iscol, Zachary J., "CAP India," *Marine Corps Gazette,* January 2006.

Joes, Anthony James, *America and Guerrilla Warfare,* University Press of Kentucky, 2000.

_____. *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook*, Greenwood Press, 1996.

_____. *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counter-insurgency,* University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

Johnson, Wray R., *Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars*, White Lotus, 2001.

Kelly, John, "Tikrit, South to Babylon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February-April, 2004.

Kilcullen, David, "A Strategy for Global Counter-Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2005.

Kitson, Frank, *Low Intensity Operations,* Stackpole Books, 1971.

Komer, R.W., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort,* RAND, 1972.

Krepinevich, Andrew F., *The Army in Vietnam*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Krasner, Stephen D. and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2005.

Mattis, James N., "The Professional Edge," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb. 2004.

McDaniel, Lance A., "Transitioning From Conventional Combat," *Marine Corps Gazette,* Nov. 2005.

Metz, Steven and R. Millen, *Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Respons*e, Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

Metz, Steven, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 1, 2003.

Mundy, Carl E. III, "Spare the Rod, Save the Nation," *New York Times*, Dec. 30, 2003.

Nagl, John A., *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,* Praeger, 2002.

Norton, Kevin, "The 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment's Operations in Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette,* May 2005.

O'Neill, Bard E., *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare,* Brassey's, 1990.

Paschall, Joseph, "Tactical Information Operations in OIF," *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2004, pp. 56-59.

Palazzo, Lois J., "To Build a Nation's Army," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec. 2005.

Rathmell, Andrew, "Planning Postconflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" *International Affairs*, October 2005.

Reynolds, Nicholas E., *Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

Scales, Robert H., *Firepower in Limited War*, Presidio, 1997.

Shelton, Paul A., "Leveraging Actionable Intelligence," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec. 2005.

Simeoni, John, "US Marine Urban Combined-arms Operations in Iraq: Some Observations," *Australian Army Journal*, Autumn 2005.

Slim, William J., *Defeat into Victory,* PAPERAMC, 1986.

Skuta, Philip C., "Introduction to 2/7 CAP Platoon Actions in Iraq," and "Partnering With Iraqi Security Forces," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan. 2006.

Thompson, Robert, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam,* New York: Praeger, 1966.

U.S. Army, Field Manual Interim, 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, October 2004.

U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual,* Government Printing Office, 1940.

U.S. Marine Corps, *CETO Quick Look: Dealing With the Civilian Population in Post-Saddam Iraq,* Quantico, VA: Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Feb. 6, 2003.

U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars/21st Century*, Quantico, VA: Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, 2003 edition.

U.S. Marine Corps, *Summary Report of USMC Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Quantico, VA: Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team, 2004.

Walker, Michael M., "Marine Civil Affairs and the GWOT," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 2006.

West, Francis, *The Village*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

_____. *The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division,* New York: Bantam Books, 2003.

_____. *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah*, New York: Bantam Books, 2005.

Williamson, Curtis L., "The U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP): A Proposed Alternative Strategy for Vietnam," unpublished master's thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. 1999.

Glossary of Terms

AO	Area of Operations
BST	Battlespace Support Team
BUST	Basic Urban Skills Training
C2PC	Command and Control-Personal Computer
CAG	Civil Affairs Group
CAP	Combined Action Platoon or program
CBT	Cross-Boundary Team
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
ETT	Embedded Training Teams
HETs	Human Exploitation Teams
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IO	Information Operations
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JDAM	Joint Direct Action Munition
MAGTF	Marine Air and Ground Task Force
MCWL	Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MTT	Mobile Training Team
OHRA	Office for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activity
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PsyOps	Psychological Operations
Relief in Place	An operation where all or part of a unit is replaced in an AO by an incoming unit which assumes responsibility for the mission and the AO and continues the operation as ordered.
SASO	Stability and Security Operations
T/E	Table of Equipment
T/O	Table of Organization
TECOM	Training and Education Command
TFC	Tactical Fusion Center
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles